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ABSTRACT
Password has been the dominant authentication scheme for more than 30 years, and it will
not be easily replaced in the foreseeable future. However, password authentication has long
been plagued by the dilemma between security and usability, mainly due to human
memory limitations. For example, a user often chooses an easy-to-guess (weak) password
since it is easier to remember. The ever increasing number of online accounts per user even
exacerbates this problem. In this dissertation, we present four research projects that focus
on the security of password authentication and its ecosystem.
First, we observe that personal information plays a very important role when a user creates
a password. Enlightened by this, we conduct a study on how users create their passwords
using their personal information based on a leaked password dataset. We create a new
metric—Coverage—to quantify the personal information in passwords. Armed with this
knowledge, we develop a novel password cracker named Personal-PCFG (Probabilistic
Context-Free Grammars) that leverages personal information for targeted password
guessing. Experiments show that Personal-PCFG is much more efficient than the original
PCFG in cracking passwords.
The second project aims to ease the password management hassle for a user. Password
managers are introduced so that users need only one password (master password) to access
all their other passwords. However, the password manager induces a single point of failure
and is potentially vulnerable to data breach. To address these issues, we propose BluePass,
a decentralized password manager that features a dual-possession security that involves a
master password and a mobile device. In addition, BluePass enables a hand-free user
experience by retrieving passwords from the mobile device through Bluetooth
communications.
In the third project, we investigate an overlooked aspect in the password lifecycle, the
password recovery procedure. We study the password recovery protocols in the Alexa top
500 websites, and report interesting findings on the de facto implementation. We observe
that the backup email is the primary way for password recovery, and the email becomes a
single point of failure. We assess the likelihood of an account recovery attack, analyze the
security policy of major email providers, and propose a security enhancement protocol to
help securing password recovery emails by two factor authentication.
Finally, we focus on a more fundamental level, user identity. Password-based
authentication is just a one-time checking to ensure that a user is legitimate. However, a
user’s identity could be hijacked at any step. For example, an attacker can leverage a
zero-day vulnerability to take over the root privilege. Thus, tracking the user behavior is
essential to examine the identity legitimacy. We develop a user tracking system based on
OS-level logs inside an enterprise network, and apply a variety of techniques to generate a
concise and salient user profile for identity examination.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Securing the user authentication process is a fundamental requirement in building an information
system. Password-based authentication remains the most dominant method ever since it was intro-
duced more than 30 years ago. Along with its popularity, many works have been done to study its
security, management, and usability. A long-plauged drawback of password is that users tend to
choose weak passwords (i.e., passwords that are easily remembered but also could be easily cracked),
mainly due to human limited memory. There are many previous works focusing on understanding
the composition of a user password. An early work shows that many passwords are merely dictionary
words [86]. Recent works also demonstrate that passwords are phonetically similar to a user’s native
language [87], and many passwords share common patterns [121], or semantic structures [114]. It
is also revealed that date or birthdate are prevalent in passwords and 4-digit PINs [23, 115]. Many
password crackers are also built to demonstrate that a large amount of user chosen passwords can
be easily cracked within a short period of time [29,56,86, 87,89,121].
Realizing that passwords are not secure, alternative authentication methods have been proposed,
such as biometrics-based [59] or graphics-based [37, 60]. However, none of these new techniques
can surpass text passwords in every aspect of security, usability, and deployment in practice. It is
believed that passwords will not be easily replaced in the near future [21]. As such, people also strive
to enhance the security of password authentication. A first challenge encountered is that it is hard to
measure the strength of a password, after showing that entropy is not an accurate indicator [26,120].
Nowadays, a commonly used measure is to estimate the password strength by how easy it can be
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cracked by using modern crackers [67]. Furthermore, it is difficult for passwords to achieve high
security levels. Traditional wisdom suggests users to create strong passwords and not to re-use a
same password across different services. However, users seldom follow these security suggestions
due to usability considerations [22, 36]. Some researches aim to nudge the users to choose stronger
passwords, including setting strict password policy [120], providing strength feedback [43,67,112] and
password managers [77,85,97,105,119]. It is also common that people introduce more factors in user
authentication besides passwords, such as additional knowledge [25, 94] and hardware tokens [11].
Many websites now employ two factor authentication to provide better protections. However, due
to its usability problem, the adoption rate is still low [93]. It is estimated that only 6.4% of Google
users have used Google’s two factor authentication. To mitigate the usability issues, some works
attempt to make the second factor transparent to users [88,91].
The study of password has moved toward a multi-dimensional future. However, it is still a one-
time authentication method that serves as a gatekeeper for user access control. It is very possible
that user identity has changed during other steps. For instance, in an Advanced Persistent Threat
(APT) attack, an attacker may launch phishing attacks or exploit zero-day vulnerabilities to take
over other users’ privilege or escalate her own privilege. These security threats cannot be resolved
with passwords only. A potential way is to monitor user activities and achieve behavior-based user
identity audit. User behavior Analytics (UBA) describes a range of such techniques that capture
abnormal user behaviors [5, 101, 109, 111]. A foundation for UBA to be successful is to accurately
track a user’s activities inside the network. Without an accurate and complete user profile, UBA
will be much less effective, or even useless.
In this dissertation, we present four projects. The first three projects focus on password-based
authentication, including studying personal information in passwords, proposing a secure and usable
password manager, and analyzing password recovery protocols in the wild. The fourth project
explores continuous user behavior monitoring by tracking users’ activities inside a network. We
introduce each of the project in the following.
2
1.1 Personal Information in Passwords and Its Security Implica-
tions
Almost all past works related to password study try to understand the statistical pattern of pass-
words, and leverage this knowledge to launch statistical attacks on passwords [87,114,121]. Namely,
an adversary keeps trying password candidates from high probability to low probability based on
her constructed password model. However, passwords are usually highly personalized, and different
users create different passwords in a semantic sense, even if the same password creation method is
used. Personal information is believed to be frequently included in a user’s password. Thus, it is
important to understand its usage in password creation. Toward this end, we analyze the use of
personal information in passwords, and uncover what types of personal information are included
in passwords and how they are used. We quantitatively correlate the personal information and a
password by developing a novel metric—Coverage. Armed with this knowledge, we further develop a
new password cracker—Personal-PCFG—to efficiently generate personalized password guesses. Our
evaluation shows that Personal-PCFG is much faster than the state-of-art in password cracking. The
detailed analysis and experiments are presented in Chapter 2.
1.2 BluePass: A Secure Hand-free Password Manager
One way to enhance the usability and security of passwords is to use a password manager [65,102].
A password manager allows a user to create different strong passwords and store them in a password
vault. The user only needs to remember a single master password to access all her other passwords.
However, such a scheme introduces a single point of failure, as whoever can access the master
password is also able to access all other passwords. Furthermore, central storage of password
vaults on a cloud also makes massive data breach possible. To address these issues, we propose a
decentralized password manager, BluePass, that features both dual possession security and a hand-
free user experience. BluePass isolates the password vault and the decryption key, and leverages
the short-range Bluetooth to automate the log-in process to ensure the probity of a mobile device,
where the password vault resides. Through comprehensive evaluation, we show that BluePass has
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low latency, incurs little power overhead, and has good usability. We elaborate the design and
evaluation of BluePass in Chapter 3.
1.3 Email as a Master Key: Analyzing Account Recovery in the
Wild
Although the security of password itself has been extensively studied, the recovery process is largely
overlooked and has yet to be analyzed. The password recovery process allows a user to reset a
password in case she forgets the original password. There are some previous works examining the
use of security questions as a way to recover passwords [63], and conclude that security questions
are very weak and should not be solely used to recover a user account [20, 99]. However, the
overview of password recovery implementations still remains unknown to the public. The following
questions still need to be answered: (1) Are there still many websites that rely on security questions?
(2) What other schemes are employed? (3) Are they secure? (4) What happens if they are not
secure? We believe that examining the password recovery implementation is very important since
attackers may leverage this mechanism to launch attacks to many other accounts. As such, we
examine the password recovery mechanisms in the wild, which helps the security communities to
gain an overview of contemporary password recovery implementations. Our analysis confirms that
most of the websites rely on a single user email account to reset a password. We find that multiple
online accounts would be easily compromised if an email account was compromised, and many email
providers fail to properly protect users’ email accounts. Finally, we propose a security enhancement
protocol based on the current emailing infrastructure in a secure and backward compatible fashion.
The details are presented in Chapter 4.
1.4 UTrack: Enterprise User Tracking Based on OS-Level Audit
Logs
We finally go beyond the password authentication and focus on a more fundamental level—user
identity. Authentication is essentially a way to ensure user legitimacy. However, a user’s identity
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could be changed or hacked regarding to user accounts in a computer network. It is important to
continuously check the user identity of each real user inside a network for security purposes. In order
to do so, we develop a novel user tracking system based on OS-level logs. We track user activities
under both in-host and cross-host scenarios, and apply a variety of techniques to solve the “needle
in a haystack” problem that many log-based techniques faced. As a result, we are able to construct
concise and accurate user profiles within a reasonable period of time. The system is presented in
Chapter 5.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces a study on personal information in
passwords and its application in password cracking. Chapter 3 presents the novel password manager,
BluePass, that features a dual possession security and a hand-free user experience. Chapter 4
studies the contemporary password recovery protocols in the wild, and investigate the likelihood,
damage, and defense of a password reset attack. Chapter 5 explores beyond the one-time password
authentication, and focuses on continuous monitoring of user identity. We propose a novel enterprise-
level user tracking system based on OS-level logs. Chaptter 6 surveys related works, and finally,
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation and discusses future works.
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Chapter 2
Personal Information in Passwords and
Its Security Implications
2.1 Introduction
The text-based password is still believed to remain a dominating and irreplaceable authentication
method in the foreseeable future. Although researchers have proposed different authentication
mechanisms, no alternative can bring all the benefits of passwords without introducing extra burdens
to users [21]. However, passwords have long been criticized as being one of the weakest links in
authentication. Due to the human memorability limitation, user passwords are usually far from
truly random [19, 81, 87, 115, 123]. For instance, “secret” is more likely a human-chosen password
than “zjorqpe.” In other words, human users are prone to choose weak passwords simply because
they are easier to remember. As a result, most passwords are chosen within a small portion of the
entire password space, leaving them vulnerable to brute-force or dictionary attacks.
To increase password security, online authentication systems have started to enforce stricter
password policies. Meanwhile, many websites provide password strength meters to help users create
secure passwords. However, these meters are proven to be ad-hoc and inconsistent [38, 43]. To
better assess the strength of passwords, one needs to have a deeper understanding of how users
construct their passwords. Knowing the exact tactics to create passwords also helps an attacker to
crack passwords. Meanwhile, if a user is aware of the potential vulnerability induced by a commonly
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used password creation method, the user can avoid using the same method for creating passwords.
Toward this end, researchers have made significant efforts to unveil the structures of passwords.
Traditional dictionary attacks on passwords have shown that users tend to use simple dictionary
words to construct their passwords [56, 86]. The first language of a user is also preferred when
constructing passwords [19]. Besides, passwords are commonly phonetically memorable [87] even
though they are not simple dictionary words. It is also indicated that users may use keyboard strings
such as “qwerty" and “qweasdzxc,” trivial strings such as “password" and “123456,” and date strings
such as “19951225" in their passwords [76, 100, 115]. However, most studies reveal only superficial
password patterns, and the semantic-rich composition of passwords remains to be fully uncovered.
Fortunately, an enlightening work investigates how users generate their passwords by learning the
semantic patterns [114].
This project studies password semantics from a different perspective: the use of personal infor-
mation. We utilize a leaked password dataset, which contains personal information, from a Chinese
website for this study. We first measure the usage of personal information in password creation and
present interesting observations. We are able to obtain the most popular password structures with
personal information embedded. It is also observed that males and females behave differently when
using personal information in password creation. In addition, we assess the usage of names in other
leaked password datasets that do not come with any personal information.
Next, we introduce a new metric called Coverage to accurately quantify the correlation between
personal information and user passwords. Since it considers both the length and continuation of
personal information, Coverage is a useful metric to measure the strength of a password. Our
quantification results using the Coverage metric confirm our direct measurement results on the
dataset, showing the efficacy of Coverage. Moreover, Coverage is easy to integrate with existing
tools, such as password strength meters. To demonstrate the security vulnerability induced by using
personal information in passwords, we propose a semantics-rich Probabilistic Context-Free Gram-
mars (PCFG) method called Personal-PCFG, which extends PCFG [121] by considering personal
information symbols in password structures. Personal-PCFG takes a user’s personal information
as another input vector and generates highly personalized guesses for a specific account. With the
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assistance of such knowledge, Personal-PCFG is able to crack passwords much faster than original
PCFG. It also makes an online attack more feasible.
Finally, we present simple distortion functions to defend against these semantics-aware attacks
such as Personal-PCFG or [114]. Our evaluation results demonstrate that distortion functions can
effectively protect passwords by significantly reducing the unwanted correlation between personal
information and passwords.
Though our study is primarily based on a dataset collected from a Chinese website, we also try
to extend our measurement study to English-based websites. We conclude that as long as memo-
rability plays an important role in password creation, the correlation between personal information
and user passwords remains, regardless of the language. We believe that our work on personal
information quantification, password cracking, and password protection could be applicable to any
other text-based password datasets from different websites.
2.2 Personal Information in Passwords
Intuitively, people tend to create passwords based on their personal information because human
beings are limited by their memory capacities. We show that personal information plays an im-
portant role in a human-chosen password by dissecting passwords in a mid-sized password dataset.
Understanding the usage of personal information in passwords and its security implications can
help us further enhance password security. To start, we introduce the dataset used throughout this
study.
2.2.1 12306 Dataset
A number of password datasets have been exposed to the public in recent years, usually containing
several thousand to millions of real passwords. As a result, there are several password-cracking
studies based on analyzing these datasets [19,76]. In this project, a dataset called 12306 is used to
illustrate how personal information is involved in password creation.
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2.2.1.1 Introduction to Dataset
At the end of 2014, a Chinese dataset was leaked to the public by anonymous attackers. It is reported
that the dataset was collected by trying passwords from other leaked passwords in an online attack.
hereafter, it is called 12306 dataset because all passwords are from a website www.12306.cn, which
is the official site of the online railway ticket booking system in China. There is no data available
on the exact number of users of the 12306 website; however, we infer at least tens of millions of
registered users in the system, since it is the official website for the entire Chinese railway system.
The 12306 dataset contains more than 130,000 Chinese passwords. Having witnessed so many
leaked large datasets, its size is considered medium. What makes it special is that together with
plaintext passwords, the dataset also includes several types of personal information, such as a user’s
name and the government-issued unique ID number (similar to the U.S. Social Security Number).
As the website requires a real ID number to register and people must provide accurate personal
information to book a ticket, the information in this dataset is considered reliable.
2.2.1.2 Basic Analysis
We first conduct a simple analysis to reveal general characteristics of the 12306 dataset. For data
consistency, users whose ID number is not 18-digit long are removed. These users may have used
other forms of ID (e.g., passport number) for registration and account for 0.2% of the dataset
size. The dataset contains 131,389 passwords for analysis after being cleansed. Note that different
websites may have different password creation policies. From the leaked dataset, we can infer that
the password policy is quite simple—all passwords cannot be shorter than six characters. Besides,
there is no restriction on types of characters used.
The average length of passwords in the dataset is 8.44. The most common passwords are listed
in Table 2.1. The dominating passwords are trivial passwords (e.g., 123456, a123456, etc.), key-
board passwords (e.g., 1qaz2wsx, 1q2w3e4r, etc.), and phrasal passwords (e.g., “I love youâĂŹâĂŹ).
Both “5201314" and “woaini1314" mean “I love you forever" in Chinese. The most commonly used
passwords in 12306 dataset are similar to those are found in a previous study [76]; however, popu-
lar 12306 passwords distribute more sparsely in the password space. The most popular password,
9
Table 2.1: Most Frequent Passwords.
Rank Password Amount Percentage
1 123456 389 0.296%
2 a123456 280 0.213%
3 123456a 165 0.125%
4 5201314 160 0.121%
5 111111 156 0.118%
6 woaini1314 134 0.101%
7 qq123456 98 0.074%
8 123123 97 0.073%
9 000000 96 0.073%
10 1qaz2wsx 92 0.070%
Table 2.2: Resistance to guessing
H1 G˜  5  10 G˜0.25 G˜0.5
8.4 16.85 0.25% 0.44% 16.65 16.8
“123456,” accounts for less than 0.3% of all passwords while the number being 2.17% in [76]. The
password sparsity may be due to the importance of the website service nature, where users are less
prone to use very trivial passwords like “123456" and there are fewer Sybil accounts as a real ID
number is mandatory for registration.
Similar to [76], the resistance to guessing of the 12306 dataset is measured in terms of several
useful metrics, including the worst-case security bit representation (H1), the guesswork bit repre-
sentation (G˜), the ↵-guesswork bit representations (G˜0.25 and G˜0.5), and the  -success rates ( 5 and
 10). The results are listed in Table 2.2, showing that 12306 has a substantially higher worst-case
security and  -success rates than the previously studied datasets. This is mainly because the users
of 12306 avoid using extremely guessable passwords such as “123456.” It implies that users have
certain password security concerns when creating passwords for critical services like 12306. How-
ever, their security concern is limited to the avoidance of using extremely guessable passwords. As
indicated by the values of ↵-guesswork, the overall password sparsity of the 12306 dataset is not
higher than that of the previously studied datasets.
We also study the composition structures of passwords in 12306. The most popular password
structures are listed in Table 2.3. Similar to a previous study [76], our results again show that
Chinese users prefer digits in their passwords as opposed to letters that are favored by English-
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speaking users. Specifically, the top five structures all have a significant portion of digits. The
reason behind this may be that Chinese characters are logogram-based, and digits seem to be the
best alternative when creating a password.
Table 2.3: Most Frequent Password Struc-
tures.
Rank Structure Amount Percentage
1 D7 10,893 8.290%
2 D8 9,442 7.186%
3 D6 9,084 6.913%
4 L2D7 5,065 3.854%
5 L3D6 4,820 3.668%
6 L1D7 4,770 3.630%
7 L2D6 4,261 3.243%
8 L3D7 3,883 2.955%
9 D9 3,590 2.732%
10 L2D8 3,362 2.558%
“D" represents digits and “L" represents En-
glish letters. The number indicates the seg-
ment length. For example, L2D7 means the
password contains 2 letters followed by 7 dig-
its.
In summary, the 12306 dataset is a Chinese password dataset that has general Chinese password
characteristics. Users have certain level of security concern by choosing less trivial passwords.
However, in terms of the overall sparsity, the 12306 dataset is no higher than previously studied
datasets.
2.2.2 Personal Information
Other than passwords, 12306 dataset also includes multiple types of personal information, as listed
in Table 2.4.
Note that the government-issued ID number is a unique 18-digit number, which intrinsically
includes the owner’s personal information. Specifically, digits 1-6 represent the birthplace, digits 7-14
represent the birthdate, and digit 17 represents the gender—odd being male and even being female.
We take out the 8-digit birthdate and treat it separately since birthdate is a critical piece of personal
information in password creation. Thereby, six types of personal information are considered: name,
birthdate, email address, cell phone number, account name, and ID number (birthdate excluded).
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Table 2.4: Personal Information.
Type Description
Name User’s Chinese name
Email address User’s registered email address
Cell phone User’s registered cell phone number
Account name The username used to log in to the system
ID number Government-issued ID number
2.2.2.1 New Password Representation
To better illustrate how personal information correlates to user passwords, we develop a new rep-
resentation of a password by adding more semantic symbols besides the conventional “D,” “L,” and
“S" symbols, which stand for digit, letter, and special character, respectively.
The password is first matched to the six types of personal information under this new representa-
tion. For example, a password “alice1987abc" can be represented as [Name][Birthdate]L3, instead
of L3D4L3 as in the traditional representation. The matched personal information is denoted by
corresponding tags—[Name] and [Birthdate] in this example; for segments that are not matched,
we still use “D,” “L,” and “S" to describe the symbol types.
Representations like [Name][Birthdate]L3 are more accurate than L5D4L3 in describing the
composition of a user password by including more detailed semantic information. Using this repre-
sentation, the following matching method is applied to the entire 12306 dataset to uncover the way
personal information appears in password structures.
2.2.2.2 Matching Method
We propose a matching method to locate personal information in a user password, which is shown
in Algorithm 1. The high-level idea is that we first generate all substrings of the password and sort
them in descending-length order. Then we match these substrings, from the longest to the shortest,
to all types of personal information. If a match is found, the match function is recursively applied
over the remaining password segments until no further matches are found. The segments that are
not matched to any personal information will still be labeled using the traditional “LDS" tags.
In Algorithm 1, we first ensure that the length of a password segment is at least 2. Then we
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Algorithm 1 Personal Information Matching.
1: procedure Match(pwd,infolist)
2: newform empty_string
3: if len(pwd) == 0 then
4: return empty_string
5: end if
6: substring  get_all_substring(pwd)
7: reverse_length_sort(substring)
8: for eachstring 2 substring do
9: if len(eachstring)   2 then
10: if matchbd(eachstring,infolist) then
11: tag  “[BD]"
12: leftover  pwd.split(eachstring)
13: break
14: end if
15: . . .
16: if matchID(eachstring,infolist) then
17: if tag != None then
18: tag  tag + “&[ID]”
19: else
20: tag  “[ID]"
21: end if
22: leftover  pwd.split(eachstring)
23: break
24: end if
25: else
26: break
27: end if
28: end for
29: if leftover.size()   2 then
30: for i  0 to leftover.size()-2 do
31: newform MATCH(leftover[i],infolist) + tag
32: end for
33: newform MATCH(leftover[leftover.size()  1])+newform
34: else
35: newform seg(pwd)
36: end if
37: results extract_ambiguous_structures(newform)
38: return results
39: end procedure
try to match eligible segments to each kind of the personal information (line 10 and line 16). Note
that personal information may not always appear as it is. Instead people sometimes may mangle
them a bit or use abbreviations. As each case is different, we do not present the specific algorithms
13
used for each type of the personal information. Instead, we describe the methods as follows. For
the Chinese names, we convert them into Pinyin form, which is the alphabetic representation of
Chinese characters. Then we compare password segments to 10 possible permutations of a name,
such as lastname+firstname and last_initial+firstname. If the segment is exactly the same as one
of the permutations, we consider it a match. For birthdate, we list 17 possible permutations, such
as YYYYMMDD, and compare them with a password segment. If the segment is the same as any
permutation, we consider it a match. For account name, email address, cell phone number, and
ID number, we further constrain the length of a segment to be at least 3 to avoid mismatching by
coincidence.
Note that for one password segment, it may result in matches of multiple types of personal
information. In such cases, all matches are counted. Thus, the results of Algorithm 1 contain all
possible matches.
2.2.2.3 Matching Results
After applying Algorithm 1 to 12306 dataset, we find that 78,975 out of 131,389 (60.1%) of the
passwords contain at least one of the six types of personal information. Apparently, personal
information is frequently used in password creation. The ratio could be even higher if we know more
personal information about users. We present the top 10 password structures in Table 2.5 and the
usage of personal information in passwords in Table 2.6. As mentioned above, a password segment
may match multiple types of personal information, and we count all of these matches. Therefore, the
sum of the percentages is greater than 60.1%. Within 131,389 passwords, we obtain 1,895 password
structures. Based on Tables 2.5 and 2.6, we can see that people largely rely on personal information
when creating passwords. Among the 6 types of personal information, birthdate, account name,
and name are most popular with a more than 20% occurrence rate, and 12.66% of users include
email in their passwords. However, only small percentage of people include their cellphone and ID
number in their passwords (less than 3%).
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Table 2.5: Most Frequent Password Structures.
Rank Structure Amount Percentage
1 [ACCT] 6,820 5.190%
2 D7 6,224 4.737%
3 [NAME][BD] 5,410 4.117%
4 [BD] 4,470 3.402%
5 D6 4,326 3.292%
6 [EMAIL] 3,807 2.897%
7 D8 3,745 2.850%
8 L1D7 2,829 2.153%
9 [NAME]D7 2,504 1.905%
10 [ACCT][BD] 2,191 1.667%
Table 2.6: Personal Information Usage.
Rank Information Type Amount Percentage
1 Birthdate 31,674 24.10%
2 Account Name 31,017 23.60%
3 Name 29,377 22.35%
4 Email 16,642 12.66%
5 ID Number 3,937 2.996%
6 Cell Phone 3,582 2.726%
2.2.2.4 Gender Password Preference
As the user ID number in our dataset actually contains gender information (i.e., the second-to-last
digit in the ID number representing gender), we compare the password structures between males
and females to see if there is any difference in password preference.
The average password lengths for males and females are 8.41 and 8.51 characters, respectively,
which suggests that gender does not greatly affect the length of passwords. Applying the matching
method to each gender, we then observe that 61.0% of male passwords contain personal information
while only 54.1% of female passwords contain personal information. The top 10 structures for each
gender are listed in Table 2.7, and personal information usage is shown in Table 2.8. These results
demonstrate that male users are more likely to include personal information in their passwords than
female users.
Additionally, we have two other interesting observations. First, the total number of password
structures for females is 1,756, which is 10.3% more than that of males. Besides, 28.38% of males’
passwords fall into the top 10 structures while only 23.94% of females’ passwords fall into the
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top 10 structures. Thus, passwords created by males seem denser and possibly more predictable.
Second, males and females vary significantly in the use of name information. While 23.32% of
males’ passwords contain their names, only 12.94% of females’ passwords contain their names. We
conclude that the use of name is the main difference in personal information usage between males
and females.
Table 2.7: Most Frequent Structures in Different Genders.
Rank Male FemaleStructure Percentage Structure Percentage
1 [ACCT] 4.647% D6 3.909%
2 D7 4.325% [ACCT] 3.729%
3 [NAME][BD] 3.594% D7 3.172%
4 [BD] 3.080% D8 2.453%
5 D6 2.645% [EMAIL] 2.372%
6 [EMAIL] 2.541% [NAME][BD] 2.309%
7 D8 2.158% [BD] 1.968%
8 L1D7 2.088% L2D6 1.518%
9 [NAME]D7 1.749% L1D7 1.267%
10 [ACCT][BD] 1.557% L2D7 1.240%
NA TOTAL 28.384% TOTAL 23.937%
Table 2.8: Most Frequent Personal Information in Different Genders.
Rank Male FemaleInformation Type Percentage Information Type Percentage
1 [BD] 24.56% [ACCT] 22.59%
2 [ACCT] 23.70% [BD] 20.56%
3 [NAME] 23.31% [NAME] 12.94%
4 [EMAIL] 12.10% [EMAIL] 13.62%
5 [ID] 2.698% [CELL] 2.982%
6 [CELL] 2.506% [ID] 2.739%
In summary, passwords of males are generally composed of more personal information, espe-
cially the name of a user. In addition, the password diversity for males is lower. Our analysis
indicates that the passwords of males are more vulnerable to cracking than those of females. At
least from the perspective of personal-information-related attacks, our observations are different
from the conclusion drawn in [84] that males have slightly stronger passwords than females.
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2.2.3 Domain Information
Cao et al. [27] proposed using domain information to crack user passwords. It draws our attention
because we have shown the involvement of personal information in a user’s password, so naturally
we are also interested in the involvement of the domain information as another aspect of semantic
information in password creation. By domain information, we mean the information of an In-
ternet domain (e.g., a web service). For example, the famous “Rockyou” dataset is leaked from
www.rockyou.com, and the domain information here is “rockyou.” In our personal information
study, the domain information is “12306.” It is reasonable for users to include domain information
in their passwords to keep their passwords different from site to site but still easy to remember. This
approach may be promising to balance password security and memorability; however, the idea has
not been validated with a large-scale experiment. Therefore, we attempt to verify whether domain
information is involved in password creation. In addition to the medium-sized 12306 dataset, we
study more password datasets, including Tianya, Rockyou, PHPBB, and MySpace datasets. In each
dataset, we search the domain information and its meaningful substrings in the passwords. The
results are shown in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9: Domain Information in Passwords.
Dataset Password Amount Domain Info Amount Percentage
Rockyou 14,344,391 44,025 0.3%
Tianya 26,832,592 29,430 1 0.11%
PHPBB 184,389 2,209 1.2%
12306 131,389 490 0.4%
MySpace 37,144 72 0.2%
From Table 2.9, we can see that some users indeed include domain information in their passwords.
Our results indicate that all the datasets examined have 0.11% to 1.2% of passwords that contain
domain information. However, the small percentage indicates that while the inclusion of domain
information in a password helps users to create different passwords for different websites, not many
users are currently using such a method.
1We find that 45,574 passwords in the Tianya dataset is “111222tiany." It does not make much sense that so
many users would have the same password, and it is highly likely that they are sybil accounts. Thus, these
duplications are removed from our analysis.
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Table 2.10: NameSets
Set Name Total Number Unique Number Common LongCommon4 LongCommon5
Firstname 138,797,749 4,347,667 1,652 1,519 1,232
Lastname 138,797,749 5,369,437 1,497 1,390 1,179
“Common" means common names, where the name has more than 10,000 occurrences in the dataset,
“LongCommon4" means the common names with length no less than 4, and “LongCommon5" means
the common names with length no less than 5. We will use these filtered data in our experiments.
Table 2.11: Matching Results
Set Name Total Number Match4 Exact Match4 Match5 Exact Match5
Rockyou 14,344,391 3,540,629 (24.7%) 6,919 (0.05%) 1,750,702 (12.2%) 7,153 (0.05%)
PHPBB 184,389 32,180 (17.5%) 1,709 (0.9%) 14,418 (7.8%) 1,661 (0.9%)
MySpace 37,144 11,521 (31.0%) 221 (0.6%) 5,965 (16.1%) 206 (0.5%)
“Match4" means the name is at least 4-characters long. “Exact Match" indicates the password is exactly the
same as the password.
2.3 Personal Information in English-based Datasets
So far, we have only discussed personal information in 12306 dataset. However, due to cultural or
language differences, analyzing a single dataset may result in bias conclusions. To gain a better
understanding of how personal information generally resides in passwords, we try to extend the
analysis to English-based password datasets. Unfortunately, up to this point, there is no available
English-based password dataset that incorporates personal information. Due to the lack of personal
information, English-based datasets cannot provide us with an accurate correlation as we had in the
12306 dataset. However, we can still make use of some easily inferable personal information from the
password itself for a pilot study. One type of inferable information is the user’s name. Specifically,
we examine the name usage in user passwords by matching commonly used names to the passwords.
A name used in the password is a strong indicator that the user has included personal information
in the password. Though the name included in the password may have nothing to do with the
account owner, the probability of such cases should be fairly low.
2.3.1 Methodology
In this study, we use the three English-based leaked password datasets (Rockyou, Phpbb, and
Myspace) as in Section 2.2.3 and two name datasets (firstname set and lastname set) collected from
Facebook. While the three password datasets have been used extensively in many works, the two
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name datasets are not as prevalent in the research. We show the basic statistics on these two sets
in Table 2.10.
For each of the leaked password datasets, we match the password to a first name or last name
from the name datasets. Specifically, we try to find exact occurrences of the name in the passwords.
For instance, “mary" can be matched to a password “maryspassword." However, this method in-
evitably results in wrong matches since some 2-grams or 3-grams are widely shared in English words,
and people are known to use words from their first language in their passwords. Thus, it may not
be clear whether the user is using a name or an English word that coincidentally contains the name.
To mitigate this problem, we deliberately ignore names that are less than 4 or 5 characters long
in 2 separate experiments. Furthermore, we only consider common names with more than 10,000
occurrences in the datasets to mitigate the effect of too many wrong matches from less commonly
used names. We show the filtered results in Table 2.11. A match is considered found when a first
name or a last name is in the password.
Note that there could be both under-matching and over-matching in this study. On the under-
matching side, short names such as “Mary" and “Dave" are ignored under “LongCommon5" criteria.
Furthermore, some users may use their name initials in passwords, which makes accurate matching
much harder. Our study does not consider such cases. On the over-matching side, the problem of
commonly shared n-grams still persists. With stricter filtering (ignoring short names), there should
be much fewer wrong matches, which in turn results in under-matching.
2.3.2 Results
From Table 2.11, we can see that websites in English-speaking cultures still have a significant use
of names in their passwords. For instance, the largest dataset “Rockyou" has more than 24.7%
of passwords containing a name of length at least 4, and 12.2% of passwords containing a name
of at least length 5. Furthermore, the exact match is not negligible. Exact matches are a strong
indication of the use of personal information. In the 12306 dataset, the exact match has lower than
a 1% probability, which is basically consistent with this study. Similarly, PHPBB and MySpace also
indicate a large name use in their password sets. Our findings are consistent with the expectation
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that people from different cultures and language backgrounds tend to include their personal infor-
mation in their passwords. Furthermore, the extent of name use in their passwords does not largely
differ—while 12306 has roughly 23% name use in a passwords, the three English-based datasets
have 17.5% to 31.0% name use when only names of at least length 4 are considered.
Although our experiments shed light on general personal name use in English-based passwords,
we cannot use these datasets in our study on personal information correlation and password cracking
since all personal information is inferred from passwords.
2.4 Correlation Quantification
While the analysis above show the correlation between each type of personal information and pass-
words, they cannot accurately measure the degree of personal information involvement in an in-
dividual password. Thus, we introduce a novel metric—Coverage—to quantify the involvement
of personal information in the creation of an individual password in an accurate and systematic
fashion.
2.4.1 Coverage
The value of Coverage ranges from 0 to 1. A larger Coverage implies a stronger correlation. Cov-
erage “0" means no personal information is included in a password, and Coverage “1" means the
entire password is perfectly matched with one type of personal information. Though Coverage is
mainly used for measuring an individual password, the average Coverage also reflects the degree of
correlation in a set of passwords. In the following, we describe the algorithm to compute Coverage,
presents a detailed example to illustrate how Coverage works, and elaborates the key features of
Coverage.
2.4.1.1 Computation Method
To compute Coverage, we take the password and personal information in terms of strings as input
and adopt a sliding window approach. To conduct the computation, a dynamic-sized window sliding
from the beginning to the end of the password is maintained. The initial size of the window is 2. If
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the segment behind the window matches to a certain type of personal information, the window size
grows by 1. Then we try again to match the new segment to the personal information. If a match
is found, the window size is further enlarged until a mismatch happens. At this point, the window
resets to the initial size and continues sliding from where the mismatch happens.
Meanwhile, an array called tag array with the same length as the password is used to record the
length of each matched password segment. For example, assuming a password with a length of 8,
and its tag array is [4,4,4,4,0,0,2,2]. The first four elements in the array (i.e., {4,4,4,4}), indicate
that the first 4 password symbols match a certain type of personal information. The following two
elements in the array ({0,0} indicate that the 5th and 6th symbols have no match. The last two
elements in the array ({2,2}) imply that the 7th and 8th symbols again match a certain type of
personal information. The personal information types matched with different password segments
may or may not be the same. After eventually sliding window through the entire password string,
the tag array is used to compute the value of Coverage—the sum of squares of the matched password
segment length divided by the square of the password length. Mathematically, we have
CV G =
nX
i=1
(
l2i
L2
), (2.1)
where n denotes the number of matched password segments, li denotes the length of the correspond-
ing matched password segment, and L is the length of the password. We show the algorithm of
computing Coverage in Algorithm 2. A match is found if at least a 2-symbol long password segment
matches to a substring of certain personal information.
To better illustrate how Coverage is computed, we show a simple example in Figure 2.1. Here we
assume a user named Alice, who was born on August 16, 1988. One password of Alice happens to
be “alice816." If applying the matching algorithm in Section 2.2.2.2, the structure of this password
will be [NAME][BD]. Apparently, her password is highly related to her personal information. To
quantify this correlation, we follow the Algorithm 2 to compute Coverage for her. The computation
steps are shown in Figure 2.1, and each step is detailed as follows. In step (a), the tag array
is initialized as [0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]. Note the personal information includes “alice" as the name and
“19880816" as the birthdate. In step (b), the window size is initialized to 2 so that the first two
21
Algorithm 2 Compute Coverage.
1: procedure Cvg(pwd,infolist)
2: windowsize 2
3: pwdlen len(pwd)
4: matchtag  [0]*pwdlen
5: matchmark  0
6: cvg  0
7: while windowsize len(pwd) do
8: passseg  pwd[0 : windowsize]
9: if passseg = substring of anyinfo in infolist then
10: for j  matchmark to matchmark+windowsize do
11: matchtag[j] windowsize
12: end for
13: if windowsize != len(pwd) then
14: windowsize windowsize+1
15: end if
16: else
17: matchmark  matchmark+windowsize
18: pwd pwd[windowsize :]
19: windowsize 2
20: end if
21: end while
22: for eachitem in matchtag do
23: cvg  cvg + eachitem
24: end for
25: return cvg/(pwdlen ⇤ pwdlen)
26: end procedure
symbols in the password are covered. As “al" is a substring of Alice’s name, a match is found.
Therefore, we extend the window size by 1, and the tag array is updated as [2,2,0,0,0,0,0,0]. From
step (c) to step (e), the window keeps growing since matches are continuously found. The tag array
also keeps being updated. Until step (f), the window now covers “alice8," which is not a match of
“alice" or “19880816." Therefore, the window size is reset to 2 and the window slides to the position
of the symbol of the previous window that causes the mismatch (i.e., the position of “8"). The tag
array remains unchanged. In step (g), the window of size 2 now covers “81," which is a substring
of her birthdate, so again we extend the window by 1 and update the tag array to [5,5,5,5,5,2,2,0].
After the window grows by 1 in step (h), “816" is again found as a match. The tag array is updated
to [5,5,5,5,5,3,3,3]. The window does not grow or slide anymore since it has reached the end of the
password. In the last step (i), the tag array is ready to be used in computing the Coverage value.
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Figure 2.1: An Example of Coverage Computing.
Gray boxes hold unvisited password symbols. Yellow and red boxes denote that the symbols inside are
covered by the sliding window. White boxes denote that the symbols inside have been settled (i.e. the
window stops extending).
Based on Equation 2.1, the coverage is computed as
CV G =
2X
i=1
l2i
L2
=
52 + 32
82
= 0.52.
Coverage is independent of password datasets. As long as we can build a complete string list of
personal information, Coverage can accurately quantify the correlation between a user’s password
and its personal information. For personal information segments with the same length, Coverage
stresses the continuation of matching. A continuous match is stronger than fragmented matches.
That is to say, for a given password of length L, a matched segment of length l (l  L) has a
stronger correlation to personal information than two matched segments of length l1 and l2 with
l = l1 + l2. For example, a matched segment of length 6 is expected to have a stronger correlation
than 2 matched segments of length 3. This feature of Coverage is desirable because multiple shorter
segments (i.e., originated from different types of personal information) are usually harder to guess
and more likely to involve a wrong match due to coincidence. Since it is difficult to differentiate a
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Figure 2.2: Coverage distribution - 12306.
real match from a coincidental match, we would like to minimize the effect of false matches by taking
squares of the matched segments to compute Coverage in favor of a continuous match. Coverage
is independent of password datasets. As long as we can build a complete string list of personal
information, Coverage can quantify the correlation between the password and these information.
2.4.2 Coverage Results on 12306
We compute the Coverage value for each user in the 12306 dataset and show the result as a cumula-
tive distribution function in Figure 2.2. To easily understand the value of Coverage, we discuss a few
examples to illustrate the implication of a roughly 0.2 Coverage. Suppose we have a 10-symbol-long
password. One matched segment with length 5 will yield 0.25 Coverage. Two matched segments
with length 3 (i.e., in total 6 symbols are matched to personal information) yield 0.18 Coverage.
Moreover, 5 matched segments with length 2 (i.e., all symbols are matched but in a fragmented
fashion) yield 0.2 Coverage. Apparently, Coverage of 0.2 indicates a fairly high correlation between
personal information and a password.
The median value for a user’s Coverage is 0.186, which implies that a significant portion of user
passwords have relatively high correlation to personal information. Furthermore, around 10.5% of
users have Coverage of 1, which means that 10.5% of passwords are perfectly matched to exactly
one type of personal information. However, around 9.9% of users have zero Coverage, implying no
use of personal information in their passwords.
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The average Coverage for the entire 12306 dataset is 0.309. We also compute the average
Coverages for male and female groups, since we observe that male users are more likely to include
personal information in their passwords in Section 2.2.2.4. The average Coverage for the male
group is 0.314, and the average Coverage for the female group is 0.269. This complies with our
previous observation and indicates that the correlation for male users is higher than that of female
users. Conversely, it also shows that Coverage works very well to quantify the correlation between
passwords and personal information.
2.4.3 Coverage Usage
Coverage could be very useful for constructing password strength meters, which have been reported
as mostly ad-hoc [38]. Most meters give scores based on password structure and length or blacklist
commonly used passwords (e.g., the notorious “password"). There are also meters that perform
simple social profile analysis, such as that a password cannot contain the user’s names or the
password cannot be the same as the account name. However, these simple analysis mechanisms can
be easily manipulated by slightly mangling a password, while the password remains weak. Using
the metric of Coverage, password strength meters can be improved to more accurately measure the
strength of a password. Moreover, it is straightforward to implement Coverage as a part of the
strength measurement (only a few lines of Javascript should do). More importantly, since users
cannot easily defeat the Coverage measurement through simple mangling methods, they are forced
to select more secure passwords.
Coverage can also be integrated into existing tools to enhance their capabilities. There are sev-
eral Markov model-based tools that predict the next symbol when a user creates a password [71,120].
These tools rank the probability of the next symbol based on the Markov model learned from dic-
tionaries or leaked datasets, and then show the most probable predictions. Since most users would
be surprised to find that the next symbol in their mind matches the tool’s output exactly, they
may choose a less predictable symbol. Coverage helps to determine whether personal information
prediction ranks high enough in probability to remind a user of avoiding the use of personal infor-
mation in password creation.
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2.5 Personal-PCFG
After investigating the correlation between personal information and user passwords through mea-
surement and quantification, we further study their potential usage to crack passwords from an
attacker’s point of view. Based on the PCFG approach [121], we develop Personal-PCFG as an
individual-oriented password cracker that can generate personalized guesses towards a targeted user
by exploiting the already known personal information.
2.5.1 Attack Scenarios
We assume that the attacker knows a certain amount of personal information about the targets.
The attacker can be an evil neighbor, a curious friend, a jealous husband, a blackmailer, or even a
company that buys personal information from other companies. Under these conditions, targeted
personal information is rather easy to obtain by knowing the victim personally or searching online,
especially on social networking sites (SNS) [50,72]. Personal-PCFG can be used in both offline and
online attacks.
In traditional offline password attacks, attackers usually steal hashed passwords from victim
systems and then try to find out the unhashed values of these passwords. As a secure hash function
cannot be simply reversed, the most popular attacking strategy is to guess and verify passwords by
brute force. Each guess is verified by hashing a password (salt needs to be added) from a password
dictionary and comparing the result to the hashed values in the leaked password database. High-
probability password guesses can usually match many hashed values in the password database and
thus are expected to be tried first for efficiency purpose. For offline attacks, Personal-PCFG is
much faster in guessing the correct password than conventional methods, since it can generate
high-probability personalized passwords and verify them first.
For an online attack, the attacker does not even have a hashed password database, so he or she
instead tries to log in directly to the real systems by guessing the passwords. It is more difficult
to succeed in online attacks than offline attacks because online service systems usually throttle
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login attempts in a given period of time. If the attempt quota has been reached without inputting a
correct password, the account may be locked temporarily or even permanently unless certain actions
are taken (e.g., call the service provider). Therefore, online attacks require accurate guesses, which
can be achieved by integrating personal information. Personal-PCFG can crack around 1 out of 20
passwords within only 5 guesses.
2.5.2 A Revisit of PCFG
Personal-PCFG is based on the basic idea of PCFG method [121] and provides an extension to
further improve its efficiency. Before we introduce Personal-PCFG, we briefly revisit principles of
PCFG. PCFG pre-processes passwords and generates base password structures such as “L5D3S1”
for each of the passwords. Starting from high-probability structures, the PCFG method substi-
tutes the “D” and “S” segments using segments of the same length learned from the training set.
These substitute segments are ranked by probability of occurrence learned from the training set.
Therefore, high-probability segments will be tried first. One base structure may have a number of
substitutions; for example, “L5D3S1” can have “L5123!” and “L5691!” as its substitutions. These
new representations are called pre-terminal structures. No “L” segment is currently substituted
since the space of alpha strings is too large to learn from the training set. Next, these pre-terminals
are ranked from high probability to low probability. Finally “L” segments are substituted using a
dictionary to generate actual guesses. Besides, PCFG method also carries an efficient algorithm to
enumerate passwords from high probability to low probability on the fly. These guesses are hashed
to compare with the values in password databases. Since PCFG can generate statistically high-
probability passwords first, it can significantly reduce the guessing number of traditional dictionary
attacks.
2.5.3 Personal-PCFG
Personal-PCFG leverages the basic idea of PCFG. Besides “L,” “D,” and “S” symbols, it features
more semantic symbols, including “B” for birthdate, “N” for name, “E” for email address, “A” for
account name, “C” for cellphone number, and “I” for ID number. Richer semantics make Personal-
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PCFG more accurate in guessing passwords. To make Personal-PCFG work, an additional personal
information matching phase and an adaptive-substitution phase are added to the original PCFG
method. Therefore, Personal-PCFG has 4 phases in total, and the output of each phase will be fed
to the next phase as input. The output of the last phase is the actual guesses. We now describe
each phase in detail along with simple examples.
2.5.3.1 Personal Information Matching
Given a password, we first match the entire password or a substring of the password to its personal
information. The detailed algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1. However, this time we also record the
length of the matching segment. We replace the matched segments in a password with corresponding
symbols and mark each symbol with its length. Unmatched segments remain unchanged. For
instance, we assume Alice was born on August 16, 1988, and her password is “helloalice816!.” The
matching phase will replace “alice” with “N5" and “816” with “B3." The leftover “hello” is kept
unchanged. Therefore the outcome of this phase is “helloN5B3!."
2.5.3.2 Password Pre-processing
This phase is similar to the pre-processing routine of the original PCFG; however, based on the
output of the personal information matching phase, the segments already matched to personal
information will not be processed. For instance, the sample structure “helloN5B3!" will be updated
to “L5N5B3S1" in this phase. Now the password is fully described by semantic symbols of Personal-
PCFG, and the output in this phase provides base structures for Personal-PCFG.
2.5.3.3 Guess Generation
Similar to the original PCFG, we replace “D” and “S” symbols with actual strings learned from the
training set in descending probability order. “L” symbols are replaced with words from a dictionary.
Similar to PCFG [121], we output the results on the fly, so we do not need to wait for all of
the possible guesses being calculated and sorted. The guesses keep being generated for next step.
Note that we have not replaced any symbols for personal information, so the guesses are still not
actual guesses. We do not handle personal information in this step, since personal information of
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each user is different. Thus, the personal information symbols can only be substituted until the
target user is specified. Therefore, in this phase, the base structures only generate pre-terminals,
which are partial guesses that contain part of actual guesses and part of Personal-PCFG semantic
symbols. For instance, the example “L5N5B3S1" is instantiated to “helloN5B3!" if “hello” is the
first 5-symbol-long string in the input dictionary and “!” has the highest probability of occurrence
among 1-symbol special characters in the training set. Note that for “L” segments, each word of
the same length has the same probability. The probability of “hello” is simply 1N , in which N is the
total number of words of length 5 in the input dictionary.
2.5.3.4 Adaptive Substitution
In the original PCFG, the output of guess generation can be applied to any target user. However, in
Personal-PCFG, the guess will be further instantiated with personal information, which is specific
to only one target user. Each personal information symbol is replaced by corresponding personal
information of the same length. If there are multiple candidates of the same length, all of them
will be included for trial. In our example “helloN5B3!,” “N5" will be directly replaced by “alice.”
However, since “B3" has many candidate segments and any length 3 substring of “19880816” may
be a candidate, the guesses include all substrings, such as “helloalice198!,” “helloalice988!,” . . .,
“helloalice816!” We then try these candidate guesses one by one until we find one candidate that
matches exactly the password of Alice. Note that on the contrary of having multiple candidates, not
all personal information segments can be replaced because same-length segments may not always
be available. For instance, a pre-terminal structure “helloN6B3!” is not suitable for Alice since her
name contains only 5 characters. In this case, no guess from this structure should be generated for
Alice.
2.5.4 Cracking Results
We compare the performance of Personal-PCFG and the original PCFG using the 12306 dataset,
which has 131,389 users. We use half of the dataset as the training set, and the other half as the
testing set. For the “L" segments, both methods need to use a dictionary, which is a critical part
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Figure 2.3: PCFG vs. Personal-PCFG (Offline).
of password cracking. To eliminate the effect of an unfair dictionary selection, we use “perfect”
dictionaries in both methods. Perfect dictionaries are dictionaries we collected directly from the
testing set, so that any string in the dictionary is useful and any letter segments in the passwords
must appear in the dictionary. Thus, a perfect dictionary is guaranteed to find correct string
segments efficiently. In our study, both the PCFG perfect dictionary and the Personal-PCFG
perfect dictionary contain 15,000 to 17,000 entries.
We use individual number of guesses to measure the effectiveness of Personal-PCFG compared
with PCFG. The individual number of guesses is defined as the number of password guesses gener-
ated for cracking each individual account (e.g., 10 guess trials for each individual account), which
is independent of the password dataset size. In Personal-PCFG, the aggregated individual number
of guesses (i.e., the total number of guesses) is linearly dependent on the password dataset size. By
contrast, in a conventional cracking strategies like PCFG, each guess is applied to the entire user
base, and thus the individual number of guesses equals the total number of guesses. Regardless
of such discrepancies between Personal-PCFG and conventional cracking methods, the bottleneck
of password cracking lies in the number of hashing operations. Due to the salting mechanism, the
total number of hashes is bounded by G ·N for both Personal-PCFG and other password crackers,
where G is the individual number of guesses and N is the size of the dataset.
Given the different number of guesses, we compute the percentage of those cracked passwords
in the entire password trial set. Figure 2.3 shows the comparison result of the original PCFG and
Personal-PCFG in an offline attack. Both methods have a quick start because they always try
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Figure 2.4: PCFG vs. Personal-PCFG (Online).
Figure 2.5: Representative Points – Online attacks.
high probability guesses first. Figure 2.3 clearly indicates that Personal-PCFG can crack passwords
much faster than PCFG does. For example, with a moderate size of 500,000 guesses, Personal-
PCFG achieves a similar success rate that can be reached with more than 200 million guesses
by the original PCFG. Moreover, Personal-PCFG is able to cover a larger password space than
PCFG because personal information provides rich personalized strings that may not appear in the
dictionaries or training set.
Personal-PCFG not only improves the cracking efficiency in offline attacks but also increases the
guessing success rate in online attacks. Online attacks are only able to try a small number of guesses
in a certain time period due to the system constraint on the login attempts. Thus, we limit the
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number of guesses to be at most 100 for each target account. We present the results in Figure 2.4,
from which it can be seen that Personal-PCFG is able to crack 309% to 634% more passwords than
the original PCFG. We then show several representative guessing numbers in Figure 2.5. For a
typical system that allows 5 attempts to input the correct passwords, Personal-PCFG is able to
crack 4.8% of passwords within only 5 guesses. Meanwhile, the percentage is just 0.9% for the
original PCFG, and it takes around 2,000 more guesses for PCFG to reach a success rate of 4.8%.
Thus, Personal-PCFG is more efficient to crack the passwords within a small number of guesses.
Therefore, Personal-PCFG substantially outperforms PCFG in both online and offline attacks,
due to the integration of personal information into password guessing. The extra requirement
of Personal-PCFG on personal information can be satisfied by knowing the victim personally or
searching on social networking sites (SNS).
2.6 Password Protection
In almost all systems, users are able to choose and update their passwords. However, they may
sacrifice password security for usability since a long and random secure password is less memorable.
As user passwords are easier to be compromised when their personal information is available to the
attacker, we investigate how users can protect their passwords against such attacks.
To increase the password security while retaining good memorability, we suggest the Distortion
Function, which performs a transformation on user passwords. A distortion function converts user
passwords to be more secure by breaking password semantics. Therefore, the user only needs to
remember the original password and apply a simple function on it to create a stronger password.
This distortion function can be chosen by users, so it could be either linear or non-linear.
We conduct a proof-of-concept study to show the effectiveness of a distortion function on pass-
word security. In this study, two types of distortion functions are introduced. The first type maps
each password character to another character. For instance, add1 function simply replaces each letter
with the one 1 letter later in the alphabet and replaces a single digital number i with (i+1) mod 10.
It is similar to the Caesar Cipher [66]. In another example, addpi is a non-linear function that shifts
password letters by a corresponding position specified by ⇡, which is 314159 · · · . It shifts a letter
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Figure 2.6: Coverage distribution.
to N positions later in the alphabet with wraparound, where N is the corresponding digit of ⇡. For
instance, “abc" becomes “dcg" after applying this distortion function. The second type of distortion
function adds an extra fixed character between any pair of characters in passwords. The length of a
password becomes 2l 1, where l is the length of the original password. We call this distortion func-
tion gapx, in which “x" represents the extra symbol. For example, when x = “a”, Alice’s password
“alice816" will be extended to “aalaiacaea8a1a6" after the distortion function is applied.
The distortion function must be simple enough for users to remember and generate the pass-
words. We apply a number of easy-to-remember distortion functions on each of the passwords in the
12306 dataset individually and calculate the Coverage for the converted passwords. As Figure 2.6
shows, the distortion functions are effective in increasing password security by greatly reducing the
correlation between user passwords and personal information. Moreover, we notice that the impacts
of various distortion functions are also different. For example, add! performs the best (Coverage is
0 for all users, so it is not shown in Figure 2.6) since users rarely have special characters in their
personal information. Surprisingly, the non-linear addpi function does not produce a better result
than other linear functions such as add1 because digits preferred by Chinese users are more likely
to have coincidentally wrong matches due to its low entropy.
We conclude that distortion functions can mitigate the problem of including personal information
in user passwords without significantly sacrificing password usability. Moreover, distortion functions
are also a cure for semantics-aware password cracking methods [114], which leverage semantic pat-
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terns in passwords to crack other passwords. After applying a distortion function, the semantic
pattern is no longer available. Distortion functions are also effective against PCFG [121], since
it generates unrecognizable letter segments, which are not likely to be covered in commonly-used
password dictionaries.
What differentiates the use of a distortion function from using an extra piece of user-chosen secret
is that it breaks password semantics, which makes it much harder for an attacker to interpret since
there could be many possible (password, function) pairs that produce the same final password. Thus,
it becomes increasingly difficult for an attacker to learn how users construct their passwords, and the
inaccurate training cripples the efficiency of training-based attack. Furthermore, we do not claim
that a distortion function is able to eliminate the trade-off between security and usability. Instead,
the distortion function is only used to effectively mitigate the problem of personal information
residing in passwords.
2.7 Discussion
2.7.1 Limitation
In most of our study, only a single dataset is used. Most users of the 12306 website are Chinese, and
the number of males and females is not balanced. Consequently, there might be cultural, language,
and gender biases on the analytical results. Moreover, the effectiveness of the Coverage metric and
Personal-PCFG is only validated on a single website. Publicly available password datasets leaked
with personal information are very rare. We have done an estimation on English-based datasets,
which shows that no matter the language or culture, people include personal information in their
passwords, though to slightly different extents. However, although we have tried to extend the
analytical work to more datasets, it is infeasible to test the effectiveness of Coverage and Personal-
PCFG since personal information is directly derived from passwords.
2.7.2 Ethical Considerations
Though using leaked password datasets for more accurate and convincing study has been a main-
stream method on password studies, we do realize that studying leaked datasets involves ethical
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concerns. We only use the datasets for researching purpose. All data are carefully stored and used.
We will not expose any personal information or password or use this information in any way other
than for research use.
2.8 Conclusion
In this work, we conduct a comprehensive quantitative study on how user personal information
resides in human-chosen passwords. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically
analyze personal information in passwords. We have some interesting and quantitative discover-
ies such as 3.42% of the users in the 12306 dataset use their birthdate as a password, and male
users are more likely than female users to include their name in passwords. We then introduce a
new metric, Coverage, to accurately quantify the correlation between personal information and a
password. Our coverage-based quantification results further confirm our disclosure on the serious
involvement of personal information in password creation, which makes a user password more vul-
nerable to a targeted password cracking. We develop Personal-PCFG based on PCFG but consider
more semantic symbols for cracking a password. Personal-PCFG generates personalized password
guesses by integrating personal information in the guesses. Our experimental results demonstrate
that Personal-PCFG is significantly faster than PCFG in password cracking and eases the feasi-
bility of mounting online attacks. Finally, we propose using distortion functions to protect weak
passwords that include personal information. Through a proof-of-concept study, we confirm that
distortion functions are effective in defending against personal-information-related and semantics-
aware attacks.
35
Chapter 3
BluePass: A Secure Hand-free Password
Manager
3.1 Introduction
Text-based password still dominates online authentication despite that it has long been plagued by
a well-known and long-standing problem: the wide use of weak password. Due to limited human
memory, users tend to choose weak passwords [18, 22]. However, weak passwords are easy to guess
and thus are vulnerable to a variety of attacks [19, 81, 87, 115, 123]. Today’s increasing number of
accounts a user possesses even worsen the problem since the user poorly manage their passwords.
For example, on average users may reuse one password for as many as 3.9 online accounts [44]. As
such, instead of impractically expecting users to select a strong password for each account, password
managers are developed as built-in or standalone gadgets to help users manage their credentials.
A password manager includes a vault that stores all encrypted passwords of a user, and the user
only needs to remember one master password, which is used to generate the decryption key to the
vault, to access all the passwords in the vault. To support user authentication on different devices,
password managers usually synchronize the vaults to their own servers and provide a downloading
service to their users. However, a password manager has its own security and usability problem.
For example, password managers usually synchronize the local vault to the remote server, which
makes data breach possible [5]. Furthermore, to enhance usability, many browser built-in password
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managers do not necessarily need a master password, which makes it vulnerable to unauthorized use
and meanwhile sacrifices portability. Even being used, a master password becomes a single point of
failure. Usability issues of a password manager may even lead to reduced security, stemming from
incomplete user mental models [31].
For critical online services, users may desire more secure authentication than merely password.
Toward this end, two-factor authentication (2FA) is proposed to include another layer of protec-
tion to user accounts. Nowadays many leading service providers such as Google and Microsoft,
have integrated 2FA into their online systems. However, 2FA suffers from limited adoption due to
undesired extra burden on users. It is estimated that in 2015, only around 6.4% of Google users
are using 2FA [93]. In order to improve usability, transparent 2FA has been proposed [34, 88] by
leveraging additional devices (mainly user smartphones) to automatically complete the enhanced
authentication procedure without user involvement. However, these approaches are hard to deploy
because of imperative modifications at both the web server and the client sides.
In this project, we propose BluePass, an enhanced password manager that partially inherits
the security benefit of 2FA to improve the security and usability of existing password managers.
One of the key features of BluePass is to isolate the storage of the password vault from that of the
decryption key. Here the password vault is the set of all the encrypted site passwords of a user.
Specifically, the password vault is stored locally in a mobile device (e.g., a user’s smartphone) and
the decryption key is stored in the BluePass server, which can be accessed and downloaded only once
to a computer after authentication through a master password. The mobile device communicates
with the computer using Bluetooth in a transparent manner. When a user needs to log in a website,
the computer will automatically request the site password from the mobile device. The encrypted
site password will then be delivered through Bluetooth. Afterwards, the computer is able to decrypt
the site password using the local decryption key and auto-fill the web forms for the user. BluePass
relies on Bluetooth for communication rather than other channels, because Bluetooth can be both
transparent to users and a subtle indicator of co-location of the user mobile device.
BluePass is secure since it does not store password vaults on a server and is not vulnerable to
massive password breach. Furthermore, a server data breach is likely to leak both password vaults
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and hashed master passwords. By cracking the master password table offline, it is almost guaranteed
that most master passwords can be craked out, given today’s computing power and the weakness
of user-selected passwords. Attackers are given direct access to password vaults under such a case,
since the vault decryption key is generated from the master password. By contrast, in BluePass, the
password vault and its decryption key are stored separately, and decryption key is not generated
from master passwords, losing one of them will not practically leak any password.
While BluePass itself uses 2FA, it does not require any modifications on the website servers.
Thus, the underlying password framework remains unaltered, i.e., logging into a website still only
needs one site password. BluePass is also usable since it demands little effort to configure on the
computer and no extra effort from a user to authenticate afterwards. .
We implement a BluePass prototype in Android and Google Chrome and evaluate its efficacy in
terms of security, overhead, and usability. First, we conduct a comprehensive security analysis to
demonstrate that BluePass can defend against various attacks. Then we evaluate the auto-fill time
latency of BluePass by recording the time between login forms being detected and the forms being
automatically filled. We also run a series of experiments, in which we retrieve passwords under
different frequencies, to measure the energy overhead of BluePass. Based on our experimental re-
sults, BluePass is energy efficient while automatically filling in the login forms with user-unperceived
latency. Afterwards, we conduct a user study including 31 volunteers to examine the usability of
BluePass. The results show the test subjects regard BluePass as both secure and usable. Moreover,
the majority of testers report that they are willing to use BluePass to manage their passwords.
3.2 System Overview and Threat Model
Before presenting the BluePass system, we first introduce important BluePass notations for clarifi-
cation purposes.
• BluePass server : a server that is mainly responsible for registering users and distributing keys
to user computers.
• Key pair (K1,K2): a pair of RSA keys that are used by the mobile device and the computer
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to encrypt/decrypt site passwords. K1 is only stored in the mobile phone while K2 is stored
in the BluePass server for re-distribution. We manage to use only one pair of keys to protect
bi-directional communication, and the details can be found in Section 3.8.1.
• Master password (MP): a user uses its master password to authenticate itself to the BluePass
server and retrieve its own decryption key K2. A master password is the only password a user
needs to remember.
• Site password (SP): passwords to access online services, which will be encrypted by K1 and
then stored in the BluePass mobile application .
• Trusted computer : a computer that the user trusts, such as the user’s personal computer. It
stores the decryption key K2 for a long term.
• Untrusted computer : a computer that the user does not trust, such as a library computer.
The decryption key K2 must be retrieved from the BluePass server every time a browser is
opened in the untrusted computer. K2 is only temporarily stored in a browser instance, and
is removed when the browser instance is terminated.
• Client-side (computer/browser) application: the user installs it on the computer, which is in
charge of detecting and auto-filling login forms, communicating with the mobile device, and
decrypting the received site passwords.
• Mobile application: the user installs the app on its mobile device. The app stores the encrypted
site passwords and delivers the encrypted site passwords to the user computer through Blue-
tooth.
3.2.1 System Overview
BluePass works on two premises. First, a site password can only be recovered by having both the
encrypted site password EK1(SP ) that is only stored in the mobile device and the corresponding
decryption key K2 that is distributed through the BluePass server. Second, the encrypted site
password EK1(SP ) can only be retrieved from the mobile device to the user computer through
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Figure 3.1: BluePass Authentication
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Solid lines indicate that the process needs to be run whenever a site password is requested. Dashed lines indicate
that it does not necessarily run when a site password is requested. In a trusted computer, it runs only once for a long
term while in a untrusted computer, it runs once in each browser instance.
Bluetooth, which requires the proximity of the two devices. The flow chart of BluePass password
authentication is shown in Figure 3.1.
The working mechanism of BluePass mainly includes three phases, which are detailed as follows.
Phase 1: Registration is a once-in-a-lifecycle operation, in which a user needs to register for
the BluePass service. The user installs the BluePass mobile app on its mobile device and uses its
master password to log into the BluePass account. The mobile device is then initialized with an
empty password vault.
Phase 2: Configuration is to install and configure the user devices. First, a client-side
application needs to be installed on the user computer. Then, the user will log into the BluePass
server and download the decryption key K2 into the computer. The user will store the key either
for a long term or temporarily, depending on whether the computer is trusted or untrusted. Note
that the installation of the client-side application on a computer is also a one-time operation. The
retrieval of K2 from the BluePass server is needed each time opening a browser only when the user
is on a untrusted computer.
Phase 3: Authentication is almost transparent to the user. In a trusted device, the user only
needs to carry the registered mobile phone and wait for the passwords being automatically filled.
In a untrusted device, the user needs to re-enter the master password every time a new browser
instance is opened since the key K2 is deleted when a browser instance is closed.
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3.2.2 Threat Model
Attackers aim at stealing one or (preferably) all site passwords in the password vault. In the design
of BluePass, all the site passwords of a user are encrypted and stored in the user’s mobile device.
We assume that the attacker cannot access the encrypted site passwords in the mobile device and
knows the decryption key from the computer at the same time.
All attacks can be classified into two categories: co-located attacks and remote attacks. A co-
located attack can only happen within the Bluetooth communication range of the user mobile device,
while a remote attack can be launched from anywhere. In a co-located attack, since the attacker
could access the encrypted site passwords through sniffing, we must prevent the decryption key
from falling into the hand of the attacker. Therefore, both the BluePass server and the master
password cannot be compromised. Moreover, the communications for key distribution must be
protected. By contrast, in a remote attack, since the attacker cannot access the mobile device
through Bluetooth, either the BluePass server or the master password could be compromised. Also,
no secure communication is required for key distribution. As the Bluetooth reachability is very
limited (33 feet for class 2 Bluetooth devices), a co-located attack is much more difficult to launch
than a remote attack.
3.3 System Architecture
3.3.1 Core Functions
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, BluePass mainly consists of three phases. The first two phases,
registration and configuration of BluePass, are mostly one-time effort; however, the third phase,
authentication, will be triggered each time a user needs to log in a website. Figure 3.2 illustrates
BluePass architecture and the data flow of these three phases.
Registration. The black dotted lines in Figure 3.2 show the registration process. To register
a BluePass service, the user only needs to download a BluePass application to the mobile phone
and create a master account on the BluePass server. The creation of the master account is similar
to the creation of an account in any website. Upon logging into the master account on the mobile
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Figure 3.2: BluePass Architecture
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app, the user can choose to bind the mobile device. The binding process should follow a traditional
2FA mechanism. Namely, the user re-authenticate herself with another authentication factor, for
example, a sms. Afterward, the device information, specifically, the MAC address of the device
Bluetooth, will be uploaded to the BluePass server. The MAC address is used for the client-side
application to automatically locate the associated mobile device without user involvement. For a
newly associated device, the BluePass Server generates a pair of asymmetric keys (K1,K2). It then
distributes K1 to the mobile phone and keeps only K2 on the server side. We list the database of
the BluePass server in Table 3.1 and that of the mobile device in Table 3.2 populated with made-
up data. The registration should only be done once on the mobile device. After registration, the
mobile device is initialized as a password vault. Note that the key pair of (K1,K2) is not used as
a conventional public-key pair, where the public key is known to all and the private key is kept in
secret. Instead, the key pair is used for a two-way communication channel and both of them should
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be kept in secret.
After registration, the user has initialize a password vault in its own mobile device and associated
the BluePass account with this device.
Table 3.1: Server Side Data
Username Salt H(MP + Salt) K2 Device MAC address
Alice ifu92@fb a4f3b3c9e61b838f8cda07 . . . V DSnrzjqFBy9 . . . BC:F5:AC:9D:9A:57
Bob 01dm.a<w daa4a403bfec911a3ef199 . . . yKhTC3dNAkE . . . BC:F5:AC:9D:9A:58
Table 3.2: Mobile Device Data
Domain username K1 EK1(Password)
*.yahoo.com/* aliceweb1 AoGAKooOHMT . . . Encrypted_Password1
*.yahoo.com/* aliceweb2 V N9SdOeFbo4w . . . Encrypted_Password2
*.google.com/* aliceweb2 B1FUeDXiqv4j . . . Encrypted_Password3
Configuration. The computer needs to be configured to run BluePass, which is shown in the
dashed black lines in Figure 3.2. The user installs and runs a client-side application, and then logs
into the BluePass server to fetch the Bluetooth MAC address of the mobile device and K2 generated
during the registration. At this point, the user can choose whether the computer is trusted or not. If
the computer is trusted, the Bluetooth MAC address and K2 will be stored in the browser for a long
term. Otherwise, they will be deleted after the user closes the current browser instance. Knowing
the device Bluetooth MAC address enables the computer to pair with the device automatically by
using RFCOMM insecure mode, in which the Bluetooth data is broadcasted and the target MAC
address is specified in the data. BluePass does not rely on secure Bluetooth communication. Using
RFCOMM insecure mode enhances usability while not degrading security.
Authentication. The authentication phase is the only phase that a user will constantly ex-
perience during use of Bluepass. The solid lines in Figure 3.2 show the data flow of BluePass
authentication process. First, the user directs the browser to a website it wants to login. The
BluePass client-side application will examine the Document Object Model (DOM, which is a tree
structure representing the webpages) of the returned page and check the existence of a login form.
If a login form is present, the application requests the corresponding credentials from the mobile
phone using Bluetooth. After receiving the request, the mobile application returns the encrypted
credentials. If no related credential exists, BluePass will instead respond with a “NO_PASSWORD"
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flag. We realize that auto-filling in a non-HTTPS environment is vulnerable to JavaScript injection
attacks [102], so we only do auto-filling for websites that are based on HTTPS. For other websites,
BluePass will pop up a window for a user’s consent before filling the login form. Note that none
of the above steps require any user interactions. This fully automated authentication enables users
to login a website in a hand-free manner. When there exists more than one account for a specific
website, the browser will let the user choose an account to be decrypted and automatically filled in
the forms since there is no way to predict which account will be used.
3.3.2 Account Management
Account management is essential to a password manager. Users should be able to add, edit, or
delete the credentials in BluePass. These functions must be correctly designed to guarantee the
security of BluePass.
The addition of an online account into BluePass can be done when a user has manually inputted
the login credentials into a new website. BluePass adopts a similar approach just as current browser
built-in password managers. If the “NO_PASSWORD" flag is sent back, the browser knows that no
login credentials are associated to this particular website. If the user manually inputs the credentials,
the browser will capture the value in the form before submission and prompt a non-intrusive dialog
window, asking whether the user wishes to store the login information into BluePass. Specifically,
there are three options: “yes", “not this time", and “never". If “yes” is chosen, the browser will
encrypt the credentials using key K2 and send it to the mobile device (see Figure 3.2). The mobile
device will decrypt the information using K1 and encrypt it again using K1. Mathematically the
process is denoted as EK1(DK1(C)), in which C = EK2(SP ). Then the encrypted credentials are
stored in the BluePass database.
The edition of an online account is similar to the addition process. The browser monitors if the
user has modified the value in the login form when being submitted. If the password is changed,
the browser will prompt a dialog that asks for user permission to update the login credentials
in BluePass. Upon user consent, the browser will send the updated values in an encryption and
decryption procedure similar to that of adding a new account. Note that the chosen option of
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“never" should also be recorded in the password vault, which prevents the dialog from prompting
repeatedly. In this case, the password vault records the domain name and the username without
storing a password. When an empty password is passed back, the application is acknowledged that
the user does not wish to store the login credentials. The revocation of the “never" status can be
done in the administration page in the mobile applications.
The deletion of login credentials can also be done on the mobile application’s administration
page. The mobile application shows a list of websites whose site passwords are stored in the mobile
phone. The user can choose to delete one of the websites’ login credentials. However, the user needs
to manually input the website’s URL and login credentials. Before the deletion is granted, the user
must input the correct master password. This will prevent an attacker from manipulating the user’s
online accounts.
3.3.3 Recovery
When using a cloud-based password manager, users can backup their password vaults on the server
side. On the contrary, BluePass is de-centralized and stores local copies on mobile devices. Though
users usually do not lose their mobile devices quite often, it is essential for BluePass to back up and
recover the password vault when the mobile devices are lost, which is illustrated with red lines in
Figure 3.2.
Users can choose to back up their vaults to an external storage including a portable hard disk, a
USB, or a cloud storage. If a user loses the mobile device, it can recover the vault from the external
storage. Backing up the vault to a user-owned physical device may require the user to periodically
back up and synchronize the password vault to the external storage device. Alternatively, BluePass
allows users to synchronize their password vaults to a cloud drive provider. Nowadays many large
drive providers, such as Google Drive or Dropbox, have published APIs to facilitate data synchro-
nization. Note such design still ensures the 2FA design of BluePass – an attacker needs to breach
both the BluePass Server and the cloud provider server to collect the two necessary pieces of secret.
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3.4 Security Analysis
BluePass is secure in a sense that as long as a user does not lose two factors at the same time, the
user’s login information is safe. We conduct a security analysis on BluePass to verify the robustness
of BluePass against various attack vectors.
3.4.1 Two-Factor Security
We have introduced that BluePass relies on the premise that two factors need to be possessed to
derive a site password. The two factors are user mobile device and a master password. Now we
discuss the security of BluePass when one of the factors is compromised.
Master password. An attacker may be able to compromise the master password of a user,
which can be done through different ways such as guessing, phishing, shoulder-surfing, etc. The
compromisation of a trusted computer is also equivalent to losing the master password because the
only purpose of having the master password is to retrieve K2 from BluePass server, which can be
directly extractK2 from a trusted computer. In such scenarios, the attacker is able to obtain keyK2.
However, if the attacker does not have the password vault of the user, K2 is merely a meaningless
token and the security of BluePass holds. Besides, the user is able to change the master password
and re-generate a new key pair.
Mobile device. If an attacker gains access to the mobile device by either compromising the device
or stealing the device, it may be able to access the encrypted password vault and the encryption
key K1. However, without the decryption key K2, the attacker cannot decrypt the site passwords
from the encrypted password vault. Unlike cloud-based password managers, BluePass does not keep
master password and the vault on the same storage, thus obtaining K2 together with the password
vault is not practical. Moreover, the mobile phone itself may have its own protection, such as an
unlock code or fingerprint verification, and remote data erasal.
3.4.2 Data Breach and Brute-force Attacks
A serious threat to a password manager is data breach. Under this scenario, the attacker may be
able to mount a brute force attack against the master password of a user. In a normal password
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manager such as LastPass or 1Password, the loss of a master password also means the loss of an
entire password vault, namely, when an attacker successfully mounts a brute force attack against
the master password, it can also retrieve all the passwords from the password vault since the key
used to encrypt the vault is derived from the master password. Again, BluePass does not centralize
the password vault storage. Instead, the password vault of a user is stored locally in its own mobile
device. A server data breach would at most leak the user master passwords and then further leak
the decryption keys. However, as the password vault of each user is not stored at the BluePass
server, a data breach at the BluePass server cannot break BluePass.
On the other hand, assuming that a password vault is lost from a user’s mobile device, we
believe that brute-force cracking such an encrypted password vault is impractical given the current
computing power. We emphasize that the password vault is protected by K1, which is 2048-bit long
randomly generated RSA key. Cracking K1 is much harder than cracking a master password, which
is generated by a human user within limited and predictable password space.
3.4.3 Broken HTTPS or Bluetooth
If an attacker compromises the HTTPS communication, it will be able to steal the encryption/de-
cryption key pair (K1,K2) of a user. However, K1 and K2 are only transmitted through the web
when a user installs BluePass on its mobile device (K1) or when the user log on BluePass from a new
computer (K2), which makes the attack strictly time sensitive. Even though, having the key pair
does not help the attacker to identify any of the user’s site password, unless the attacker can also
eavesdrop on the Bluetooth connection (i.e., co-located attack) to capture the encrypted password
in transmission. On the other hand, eavesdropping Bluetooth alone does not compromise BluePass
either, since the content is encrypted.
To succeed, the attacker needs to compromise both HTTPS and Bluetooth communications to
steal site passwords from users. However, such a successful attack is very difficult to launch, due
to time (to steal the keys) and location (to eavesdrop the Bluetooth) constraints. Furthermore, a
large scale attack is infeasible since Bluetooth signals can only be sniffed within a short range.
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3.5 Implementation
BluePass consists of three major components that cooperate with each other on user authentication,
namely, a BluePass server for user registration and key distribution, a BluePass client application on
the laptop for detecting and auto-filling the website login forms, and a BluePass app on the mobile
phone serving as the password vault and administration console. We build the BluePass client
application in a Macbook Air running OS X 10.10.4 and Chrome 46.0.2490.80. We implement the
BluePass app on a Nexus 5 running Android version 4.4.2.
3.5.1 BluePass Server
We implement a BluePass server using Cherrypy [45], a python web framework. We use self-signed
certificate in https to protect communication. The key pair (K1,K2) is generated using Pycrypto1
on the server side. Sqlite database is used to store user data (see Table 3.1 for detail). When
registering to the service, we do not use the standard 2FA to verify the phone number since it is
not necessary for evaluation and user study. After registration, the user needs to log in BluePass
on both mobile application to upload mobile phone Bluetooth MAC address and download K1 and
client-side application to download K2 and Mobile phone Bluetooth MAC address.
3.5.2 BluePass Client-side Application
We build the BluePass client-side application on Chrome platform, which consists of 2 modules: one
Chrome application for Bluetooth communication and one Chrome extension for password auto-
filling. We use two modules because currently Chrome extension does not support Bluetooth API
while Chrome application does. However, only Chrome extensions allow reading and modifying the
DOM of web pages, which unavoidably makes us separate client-side application functionality into
2 modules. Chrome application is more like a native application, but it is built on Chrome platform
to deliver content in HTML, CSS and Javascript (e.g., Google Doc, Google Drive). It uses the
chrome.Bluetooth API to connect to the Bluetooth device and then communicate with the smart
1https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/
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phone through Bluetooth. The Chrome extension is responsible for detecting the authentication
form and automatically fill the form after decrypting the site password from the mobile application.
The communication between the Chrome application and the chrome extension is implemented
through Chrome External Messaging2. Specifically, this extension specifies the Application ID,
which is a unique identifier for the Chrome application. After Chrome extension delivers the data
to the application that is binded to the ID and has a pre-added listener, the listener can extract the
data. The communication from Chrome application to Chrome extension works similarly.
Our prototype implements the BluePass client on the Chrome platform to simplify the commu-
nications among different modules; however, the framework of BluePass can be widely deployed on
more platforms as long as both the computer and the mobile device have Bluetooth support and the
browser extension is able to communicate with local applications on the computer. First, Bluetooth
has become a standard device on modern computers and smartphones. Second, communication
between browser extensions and native applications has been supported by most modern browsers,
including Internet Explorer, Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Opera, etc.
3.5.3 BluePass Mobile Application
The BluePass mobile application starts a BluePass service, which runs in the background of Android
and has a dedicated thread to listen to the incoming Bluetooth connection, which helps transparently
authenticate a user to a registered website. The BluePass service inherits from the Service class in
Android and keeps running until the user explicitly stops the service.
BluePass mobile application has a simple and clear user interface, which shows the status of
the background BluePass service, either “running” or “suspended”. The user can easily change the
service status by clicking “Start BluePass Service" or “Stop BluePass Service" buttons. When the
service status is running, the Bluetooth listener starts listening and remains active even the mobile
device turns off the screen and goes to sleep. Whenever users would like to stop the service, they
just need to open the application and click the “Stop BluePass Service" button.
We use RFCOMM Bluetooth protocol to establish communication between the mobile phone
and the computer, since RFCOMM is widely supported and provides public APIs in most mod-
2https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/messaging
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Table 3.3: BluePass Scheme Evaluation
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l indicates that the scheme fully carry the characteristic andm indicates that the scheme partially carry the characteristic (the Quasi prefix).
We take rows 1-3 from [21], row 4 from [85], and row 6 from [88].
ern operating systems. Android supports two modes of RFCOMM connections, secure mode and
insecure mode. The secure mode requires successful pairing before any RFCOMM channel can be
established while the insecure mode allows connection without pairing two devices. Secure mode
RFCOMM adds another layer of encryption. However, as BluePass communication is secured by
(K1,K2) so that it does not rely on Bluetooth security. While insecure mode may fit better since
it saves a pairing step from the user, Chrome application does not support insecure RFCOMM
communication due to security concern. Therefore, we use the secure RFCOMM connection mode.
Consequently, in the registration phase, the user also needs to pair the mobile phone and the com-
puter first if they have never been paird before. Note that pairing only needs to be done once in a
computer unless the user manually deletes paird devices on the mobile phone or computer.
3.6 Evaluation
3.6.1 Comparative Evaluation Framework
We use the comparative authentication scheme evaluation framework [21] to compare BluePass
with other related authentication schemes. The results are summarized in Table 3.3. We can
see that BluePass is physically-effortless since the entire authentication process is transparent to
the user and Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry since users still need to carry their mobile phones though
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they carry them anyway. BluePass is accessible since it does not require the cellphone to have
signal or cellular data. BluePass is Quasi-Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing and Quasi-Resilient-to-
Unthrottled-Guessing. Although BluePass itself does not enhance the security of the underlying
password mechanisms, it can help defend throttled and unthrottled guessing by generating long
random passwords for users and motivating users to use more secure passwords since they do not
need to remember the passwords.
Bonneau et al. [21] points out that the framework does not describe all possible properties of an
authentication scheme. Besides these factors, BluePass also keeps a simple and clean user mental
model, which is highly suggested since wrong mental models easily make user passwords weaker [31].
Furthermore, BluePass strengthen usability by not requiring users to delete their password traces
after use on a untrusted computer as other password manager (e.g., log out master account or delete
local password vault).
3.6.2 Password Auto-fill Latency
For a usable password manager, the time required to fill the password field should be short. We
record the delay between the time that the password input form is detected and the time that the
form is automatically filled (denoted as Tbp). Since the delays on different websites may be different
due to the specific website design, we choose 20 major providers from Alexa Top 100 website [107].
For each site, we make up a username/password pair and test the pair of credentials for at least 50
times. The password of each site is a randomly generated 16 byte string composed of all 4 characters
types (Uppercase character, lower case character, digit, and special character).
Besides the Bluetooth communication latency, we also measure the loading time (denoted as
Tload) for a website since page rendering (bottleneck to load a page) and Bluetooth communication
tasks are running in parallel, indicating that the actual latency a user is experiencing is roughly
Tbp Tload, which is the time difference between BluePass running time and page loading time. Tload
is measured by injecting a piece of javascript code, which measures the time when all javascripts on
the webpage that need to run immediately are being executed subtracting the time that the browser
is ready to send the HTTP request.
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Figure 3.3: BluePass Latency
Table 3.4: Delay Statistics
Median Mean SD Skewness
Tbp 778.0 814.6 158.3 1.6
Tload 599.5 837.6 691.3 2.6
Tbp (removed) 775.0 812.5 155.2 1.6
Tload (removed) 570.0 631.4 259.8 2.6
The results for all 20 sites are shown in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 does not show the Tload results
for two web services, Tumblr and mail.ru, that have much higher Tload (averaged 2,700-2,800 ms).
Generally the BluePass delay time (Tbp) is slightly higher than the page loading time (Tload). To
illustrate the extent of the time gap, we show statistical analysis in Table 3.4. In the last two rows,
we do not include Tumblr and mail.ru in our analysis since they have significantly higher Tload that
are not representative for normal cases. With the two sites excluded, the average Tbp is 814.6 ms,
which is short enough to be acceptable by most users. Furthermore, the actual delay that a user
experiences is Tbp   Tload, which is only 181.1 ms in average. The standard deviation for Tload is
higher than Tbp. The loading time Tload could be different under various factors, such as network
condition, website implementation, etc. Since Tload highly depends on the website implementation,
heavy javascript use in a site could largely contribute to a high Tload.
On contrast, Tbp is relatively stable since Bluetooth communication and mobile device computing
are almost the same in each login attempt. Since the delay caused by BluePass is bounded by
Tbp Tload, BluePass imposes a very low latency on the password auto-filling process. According to
our user study, users can hardly notice the latency.
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Figure 3.4: BluePass Power Consumption
3.6.3 Power Consumption
One major concern of BluePass usage is the power consumption overhead on the mobile device, since
BluePass requires the mobile device serve as a Bluetooth server that keeps listening to incoming
connections. We measure the extra power consumption imposed by BluePass through monitoring
the power levels of the mobile device when running BluePass password retrieval process in different
frequencies. For comparison, we also record the power level of the device when Bluetooth is turned
off (we call it a clean state).
To monitor the current battery level of the mobile device, we register a broadcast receiver in a
simple battery monitoring application on the mobile device to listen to battery level changing event,
upon which the current battery level and the timestamp are recorded. We tune the login frequency
in the browser side (by refreshing a webpage in different frequency) to evaluate different use cases.
Except for the login frequency and BluePass on/off status, we keep all other settings exactly the
same, such as installed and running application on the device as well as the network status (e.g.,
Wifi connection is turned off). We use a Nexus 5 mobile phone for evaluation, which has 2100 mAh
battery capacity. As it takes a long time to use up the battery that has been fully charged, we run
each experiment for 10 hours before charing the phone and running the next experiment. Though
the granularity of battery usage broadcasting is in percentage level that may not be highly accurate,
it is sufficient to evaluate the power efficiency of BluePass in a 10-hour test period.
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Figure 3.4 illustrates the battery level dynamics through time under different experiment setups.
“On" means the Bluetooth is turned on and “off" means the Bluetooth is turned off. Other lines
represent the Bluepass log-in frequency. A reasonable frequency of login attempted by a normal
user should not exceed 100 times a day, which means that the login frequency should lie around
0-10 times per hour. With 10 logins per hour, the power consumption is only 1% more than a clean
state. We believe it is an unnoticeable overhead for users, given that almost 90% of users charge
their phone more frequently than once per 2 days [90]. Besides, we can see that a significant power
overhead is only incurred when the user tries to log in very frequently (17% when trying to log in
every 2 seconds). However, normal users would not try logging in at such a high frequency.
In our experiments, the mobile phone is in a state that does not receive cellular or wifi signal, so
the battery drains very slowly. When the mobile phone is in normal daily usage, the battery usage
becomes much higher. However, the BluePass power consumption remains the level of 1% of total
power with 10 hours use.
3.7 User Study
To verify how real users rate the security and usability of BluePass, we conduct a user study to
gather feedback and comments from normal users. Upon approval of IRB of our institution, we
recruit 31 volunteers to use and comment on BluePass. The volunteers include 16 males and 15
females. As the study is only in a school scale, most of them age 20 - 30 years old. Besides, most
of them have a bachelor degree. In order to spread our study of different computer expertise, we
deliberately recruit volunteers from 10 fields of study.
We ask each of the volunteer to finish a series of tasks. They are (1) register to BluePass server
and configure BluePass, (2) create a new account in our self-deployed test site, (3) log in the test
site (Migrate password), (4) try using BluePass to log in again (Log in from a primary computer),
(5) change the current password and try using BluePass to log in (Change Password), (6) configure
BluePass in another computer and log in (Log in from another computer), (7) turn off BluePass
and try logging in, and (8) turn on BluePass and try logging in. We also create a test website that
has only login and changing password functions for the volunteers to operate on.
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(a) Understandable (b) Easy to set up (c)More secure than other
PM
(d) More usable than
other PM
(e) Motivate more secure
password
(f) Motivate less re-use
password
(g) Willingness to use (h) Rate other PMs (i) Rate BluePass
Figure 3.5: Survey Results
After finishing the tasks, the testers take a post-study questionnaire. The questionnaire mainly
uses 6-point scale rating where 1 point means strongly disagree and 6 point means strongly agree.
The results are shown in Figure 3.5. Testers generally think the concept of BluePass is understand-
able and it is fairly easy to set up. 87% of testers (27 out of 31) agree that BluePass is more usable
than any other password manager they have used before.
BluePass motivates the testers to increase password security. More than 70% (22 out of 31)
of the testers state they are motivated to choose more secure passwords and less likely to re-use
existing passwords, thus making their passwords stronger. However, though the testers report they
are motivated to use more secure passwords, we notice that only 4 testers have tried using random
passwords generated by BluePass to create/change their passwords, which may result from the fact
that users feel “unsafe" to use a non-memorable password.
The majority of testers (94%) expresses willingness to use BluePass to manager their passwords.
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We also ask the testers to compare BluePass to other favorite password managers they have used,
and testers show large preference to BluePass over existing password managers. To summarize,
BluePass is generally considered more secure and usable than existing password managers by the
testers. Most of them show preference to BluePass and willingness to use it. Thus, it is reasonable
to conclude that BluePass does help users secure their passwords.
3.8 Discussion
3.8.1 RSA Key Pair
BluePass can use only one RSA key pair (K1,K2) to achieve bi-directional communication between
the mobile phone and the computer. We must guarantee that the compromise of K1 will not lead to
the compromise of K2, and vice versa. We know that all public key cryptography algorithms ensure
that it is hard to derive the private key from the public key, but not vice versa. For instance, given
an ECC private key, it is easy to derive the ECC public key, since public_key = private_key ⇤G.
However, for RSA, in theory, it is hard to derive either e or d from knowing the other one. Therefore,
we can use only one pair of RSA keys with careful parameter settings.
There are two minor things to notice in the detailed RSA implementation. First, in practice e
is usually chosen a small/fixed number, but this should be avoided. Second, RSA private keys are
often stored in their “Chinese Remainder Theorem" form, which includes the two secret numbers
often denoted p and q, from which the totient is computed. With totient and the private exponent,
the public exponent is quickly computed. Therefore, BluePass cannot use the Chinese Reminder
Theorem to speed up the calculation.
3.8.2 BluePass Limitations
BluePass has several limitations. First, a user has to carry a powered-on mobile phone to make
BluePass work; otherwise, BluePass falls back to conventional ways that users remember and input
passwords. Second, BluePass cannot work well when the mobile device or the computer does
not support Bluetooth communication. In those cases, the hand-free benefit cannot be offered by
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BluePass. Instead, the users have to use their phones to display their site passwords after inputting
their master passwords.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a hand-free password manager called BluePass for achieving both strong se-
curity and high usability. BluePass attains the security level of two-factor authentication by storing
password vaults in a mobile device and the decryption key in the user computer separately. Exploit-
ing the automatic bluetooth communication between the mobile device and the computer, BluePass
enables a hand-free password retrieval process for users. BluePass also places the decryption keys to
remote servers to support password portability while de-centralizing the storage of password vaults
to prevent a single point of failure. We implement a BluePass prototype on Android and Google
Chrome platforms. Through system evaluation, we show that the password retrieval latency a user
experiences is less than 200 milliseconds on average, and BluePass only consumes a negligible 1%
battery power with 10 hours normal use on a mobile device. Through a user study comprising of 31
testers, we demonstrate that BluePass does motivate users to choose stronger passwords and less
likely to reuse existing passwords.
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Chapter 4
Email as a Master Key: Analyzing
Account Recovery in the Wild
4.1 Introduction
Text-based passwords have been used as a dominating solution of user authentication for many
decades [86], due to their favorable usability and the fact that they cannot be entirely replaced by
other authentication approaches in the foreseeable future [21, 22]. Since text-based passwords are
vulnerable to cracking and theft attacks [87, 121], significant research efforts have been made to-
ward enhancing password security from different aspects, including measurement [67,120], password
policy [18], password meters [38,43], and password managers [77].
Whereas it is critical to secure a password at its creation and input procedures, account recovery
as an important component in the entire framework of password-based authentication has been
largely overlooked. Account recovery is an irreplaceable link in the password authentication chain.
Not being able to provide an easy way to recover the password can cause user frustration, human
labor waste, or even user loss. Meanwhile, the account recovery process should also be carefully
designed to avoid backdoor threats. Today, most websites rely on accessibility of a registered
email of a user to recover or reset forgotten passwords. Though email-based recovery is deployable,
compatible, and easy to use, its security implication is understudied. A compromised email account
could inevitably become a single-point-of-failure, since an attacker can easily reset the passwords of a
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victim’s other online accounts. Note that such an account recovery attack can naturally circumvent
security enhancements on passwords and directly compromise a large number of user accounts by
resetting their passwords.
A simple and effective idea is to keep the email account safe. However, this does not happen
in a practical world. There is a large number of email accounts leaking to malicious attackers. For
example, it was suggested by a security firm in May 2016 [4] that more than 200 million email user-
name/password combinations are in possession of hackers. Major email service providers including
Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo, and Mail.ru are all affected, and millions of email account credentials are
compromised. Thus, it is important to understand the security implications of email-based account
recovery. A systematic study on its vulnerability, potential damage, and defense has yet to be
conducted.
In this project, we first quantitatively measure the vulnerability of most websites to an account
recovery attack. In particular, we manually investigate the account recovery protocols and authen-
tication schemes adopted by the Alexa top 500 websites. We observe that 92.5% of the web services
we examined rely on emails to reset user passwords, and in 81.1% of websites, their user accounts can
be compromised by solely accessing the registered emails. The difference of 11.4% is due to the lack
of username knowledge (i.e., the username/password credential is incomplete) or classifier-based
authentication, where abnormal login attempts will be blocked. Afterward, we demonstrate the
damage that can be caused by password resets through case studies on four categories of websites,
in which we show that significant privacy and financial losses are possible to incur. Then, we exam
security policies of eight major email providers. We conclude that a significant portion of leading
email service providers fail to take deserved effort to provide user email account protection, leaving
them vulnerable to a variety of attack vectors.
Finally, we propose an account recovery protocol named Secure Email Account Recovery (SEAR)
as a preliminary solution to address the single-point-of-failure problem of user email accounts.
Specifically, the email provider adds an extra layer of protection, which can be in the form of an
SMS authentication when a password reset email is intended to be opened. Thereby, the attacker
cannot spread the attack by compromising an email account. We demonstrate that SEAR can be
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easily implemented under the current network infrastructure with full backward-compatibility, and
it can strengthen account security with an all-rounded usability consideration (i.e., similar user
experience, no need for providing the phone number to all websites that one intended to protect,
etc.).
Overall, the major contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
1. We identify the de facto account recovery protocols in the wild by examining the Alexa
top 500 websites. In the measurement study, we build taxonomies on websites and account
recovery credentials, which enable us to explore the account recovery problem from different
perspectives and dimensions.
2. We systematically investigate the email-based account recovery vulnerability that widely exists
in today’s web services. Our assessment reveals that the security risk is high and could cause
severe damage to users.
3. We propose SEAR as a preliminary solution that can be seamlessly integrated into modern
email infrastructures in a fully backward-compatible manner. The prototype of SEAR is
implemented on open-source mail servers.
4.2 Terminology and Definitions
With the development of new schemes and years of advances in multiple dimensions, the account
recovery process cannot be easily elaborated. In order to help understand and organize the het-
erogeneous makeup of the account recovery process, we first perform a classification on account
recovery credentials and websites.
4.2.1 Recovery Primitive, Method, and Protocol
Account recovery is essentially another authentication process, which needs one or multiple legit-
imacy validations. Each validation is usually done on the server side by matching a mutually
agreed-upon piece of credential " to the one supplied by the login attempter. While an " can be
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represented by a series of symbols, we categorize " into six types based on their sources, as listed
below, and we call each type a recovery primitive ( ).
• Email ( em). Email primitive is the accessibility to a registered email. The validation process
may be of various manners, such as sending a hyperlink to reset a password, sending a one-time
code for inputting a password reset form, or even directly sending back the original password.
Nevertheless, accessibility to the registered email is the only prerequisite.
• Phone ( ph). Similar to email, phone primitive demands accessibility to a phone that is
associated with a pre-registered phone number. The website may choose to call the phone
number or send a text message.
• Security question ( sq). Security question is a kind of knowledge-based authentication,
which allows a password reset if questions are answered correctly. Normally, the answers to
security questions are intrinsic to users, and hence no extra memory burden is introduced. An
example is, “What is your favorite food?"
• Private information ( pi). Private Information is also knowledge-based authentication in
a personally identifiable and thus not massively predictable sense, the answer to which is
relatively unique among different users. Although users may or may not intrinsically remem-
ber it, they usually have access to the information from other channels. Examples of such
information include a credit card number and Social Security Number.
• Activity Information ( ai). Activity information involves account activity traces. Some
service providers believe that a user is expected to be able to recall some of the most basic
activities of its account, such as the nickname/username, most login locations, and other users
with whom they usually interact. It may even require assistance from acquaintances on the
same website.
• Recovery Token ( rt). A recovery token is usually a non-memorizable piece of information
that users possess. Examples are randomly generated tokens at registration or one-time codes
generated by mobile applications (authenticators or website-designated apps).
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In some cases, websites may ask for a combination of multiple   for stronger authentication
and provide multiple such combinations for users to choose from for increased flexibility. To set
boundaries among these similar concepts, we define one way to recover a password as a recovery
method. Fundamentally, a recovery method could consist of one or multiple recovery primitives, and
all primitives should be supplied by a user correctly in order to recover its account. For example,
on a website !, one way to recover a user password may be m!,1 = { em,  sq}, meaning that
the password can be reset by whomever is in possession of the registered email and answers to
the security questions. A recovery method is the most basic unit of a successful account recovery.
Similarly, we define the set of allm that a website provides as the recovery protocol (p) of the website.
For instance, for the website !, its recovery protocol is p! = {m!,1,m!,2, . . . ,m!,i}, indicating that
there are i recovery methods and that any recovery method can be used alone to successfully recover
an account.
4.2.2 Website Classification
We categorize websites into several groups, helping us look deeper into how different websites handle
account recovery in a finer granularity, as well as conduct the damage assessment. Grosse and
Upadhyay [51] have done a user account classification based on the values of the accounts. However,
their classification is user-oriented, which heavily relies on user-subjective perspective and activity.
Namely, different users may have different types of accounts on the same website, depending on
the user’s purpose for using the websites. By contrast, we take a website-oriented approach by
classifying websites based on their service nature. We define the following six website groups with
some terminologies acquired from [51].
1. Routine. A routine website is one in which users passively receive information. Most of its
users produce zero or little long-residing content. Examples of routine accounts are online
newspapers, those used for online education, and gaming or music websites.
2. Spokesman. Spokesman website accounts usually represent a user’s opinion or identity.
Users rely on spokesman websites to deliver and exchange information with other real users.
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Examples of spokesman websites are online social networks, such as Facebook, Yelp, and
LinkedIn.
3. E-commerce. E-commerce websites mainly involve trading. A business website could be
an online retailer, such as Amazon and Ebay, or paid service providers, such as insurance
companies. It is common to find addresses, shopping histories, phone numbers, and even
payment information in user accounts on these websites.
4. Financial. A financial website usually concentrates on financial activities, such as deposits,
withdrawals, and online transactions. Examples of financial websites are banking, brokerage,
or wallet-type websites, such as Paypal.
5. Tool. A tool website does not usually produce a final product. Instead, it provides a tool or
platform for helping build or shape the final product. Examples of tool websites are search
engines, website builders, online graph drawers, and web traffic analyzers.
6. Email. Email websites provide online accounts that are associated with user email addresses,
which can send and receive emails, such as Gmail or Outlook.
Nowadays, it is common for websites to have a heterogeneous service nature. It is sometimes hard
to classify a website into a single type. For example, Google is a tool website since it offers a search
engine. Meanwhile, it is also a spokesman website (Google+) and an email website (Gmail). As such,
we sometimes classify a website as multiple types. While allowing such cases, we primarily categorize
a website based on its main services and user recognition. For example, an online newspaper may
have a review section under an article where users can express and discuss their opinions. However,
most users may only browse the news without writing any comment. Thus, the online newspaper
is categorized solely as a routine website, instead of a spokesman website.
4.3 Account Recovery in the Wild
We manually investigate the account recovery protocols adopted by the Alexa top 500 websites
to help understand the protocol composition of modern websites. Since the top 500 websites are
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ranked by their global web traffic, each of them has a large number of users (or visitors), and thus
reflects the de facto techniques adopted for account recovery.
4.3.1 Demographics
Within the 500 most traffic-heavy websites, we identify 245 websites in which we are able to create
an account. Among them, 239 (97.5%) websites have enabled an account recovery protocol (p).
Since we are only interested in recovery protocols, we consider our dataset to contain only the 239
websites thereafter. There are fewer protocols than websites due to multiple reasons. First, we
count the same protocols that share the same database only once, such as all regional Google sites
and subsidiaries of Google, like Youtube. This type includes 99 websites. Google alone contributes
55 of them. Second, there are 40 websites that do not have login functionality. For example, some
online newsletters do not need user logins. In addition, some recorded sites are just advertisement
network referrer links or content delivery networks in which not even an accessible homepage is
available. Examples are adnetworkperformance.com and www.t.co. Third, we fail to examine 51
websites with less commonly used languages. It is challenging to recognize and input CAPTCHA in
these languages, which is a required process in order to register an account. Finally, on the rest of
the websites, a local phone number or membership is mandatory for registration. Examples include
most online banking systems. These websites are not open to an outsider, and thus we are unable
to access them.
The websites being successfully examined bear a similar distribution on visitor origins in the
Alexa top 500 list. Though only a limited number of websites are examined, these popular websites
attract most web traffic. For instance, Google alone is reported to account for up to 40% of web
traffic [3]. Therefore, we believe that our analysis is representative and can genuinely cover the
mainstream of modern website account recovery protocols used by most online users.
Overall, our dataset contains 239 websites that enable account recovery, naturally including 239
password protocols. In these protocols, we identify 324 recovery methods. Then we identify 364
recovery primitives in these recovery methods. On average a website has 1.36 recovery methods,
and each method involves 1.12 recovery primitives. This implies that most of the websites provide
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Table 4.1: Recovery Primitive Distribution
Primitive Number Percentage Self-sufficient Percentage
Email 232 97.1% 213 89.1%
Phone 46 19.3% 40 16.7%
Security Question 22 9.2% 11 4.6%
Private Information 7 2.9% 0 0.0%
Activity Information 12 5.0% 10 4.2%
Recovery Token 3 1.3% 3 1.3%
“Self-sufficient" implies that the recovery primitive is the sole ingredient
in a recovery method (i.e., |m| = 1, for example, m = { em}).
only one recovery method, and recovery primitives in a recovery method are mostly homogeneous.
Note that nowadays, many websites have used Single Sign On (SSO) for logging in. SSO enables
a user to use the account of an identity provider, such as Facebook, to log into other websites. In
our dataset, 136 websites feature at least one SSO identity provider. The top three are Facebook
(103 occurrences), Google (67 occurrences), and Twitter (35 occurrences). Regarding SSO, users
should recover their accounts from the SSO identity provider website, such as Facebook.
4.3.2 Primitive and Method Usage
To illustrate the major composition of recovery protocols, we examine the usage of recovery prim-
itives and list the overall occurrence of each primitive in Table 4.1. As shown in the table, using
email to recover a password is prevailing: 97.1% of websites include email ( em) in their recovery
protocols. Furthermore, among 89.1% of websites, email itself is sufficient to recover a password
(namely, at least one of their recovery methods contains the element of email primitive only). It
is evident that most of the top websites delegate the security responsibility of account recovery to
email service providers, instead of extending and relying on their own security infrastructures.
The second most popular method is using a mobile phone, which is seen in a notable portion
(19.3%) of websites. Surprisingly, 4.6% of websites still rely exclusively on security questions to
recover passwords, which are suggested against by many previous researches [20,46,99]. Meanwhile,
private information, activity information, and recovery tokens are much less used since they may
involve more deployment costs and have privacy concerns. However, these primitives are commonly
used in sensitive online services, such as financial institutes.
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Figure 4.1: Recovery Methods – Single-Primitive
101 102
Percentage in the type
Routine
Tool
Spokesman
E-commerce
Email
Financial
Email
Phone
Security Question
Private Information
Activity Information
Recovery Token
Log scale is used for a clearer presentation of small percentages. The sum of percentage can be more than 100 (with
multiple recovery methods in a recovery protocol), or less than 100 (we show only single-primitive recovery methods)
From Table 4.1, we can also easily infer that most recovery methods contain only one recovery
primitive. In fact, recovery protocols in 95% of the websites we examined include at least a single-
primitive recovery method. As recovery methods with multiple recovery primitives are rarely found,
scattered, and hardly organizable, we focus more on unveiling the structure of a single-primitive
recovery method. Following the annotations introduced in Section 4.2.2, we identify 127 routine
websites, 82 e-commerce websites, 52 spokesman websites, 36 tool websites, 6 financial websites,
and 11 email websites. Their single-primitive recovery methods are portrayed in Figure 4.1. It is
not surprising to see that different genres of websites use different single-primitive recovery methods
to balance their own security and usability trade-off.
From the figure, we can also see that financial websites are quite different from the other five
— only one website uses a single-primitive method for account recovery (private information).
Financial websites are the only type of website that usually has multiple recovery primitives in a
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recovery method. The other five types of websites all heavily rely on email (more than 80% for
email sites and more than 90% for the other four) for account recovery. Using a phone follows as
the second most commonly seen account recovery method. Interestingly, email websites themselves
heavily rely on a mobile phone to recover passwords and are significantly more prone to use account
recovery primitives other than email services. One possible explanation is that the email is already
the end point of an account recovery chain and that email service providers prefer not to lead their
users to their competitors’ email services. Thus, they attempt to offer other remedies, such as a
mobile phone.
The usage of multiple-primitive recovery methods is not very common, given the fact that on
average a recovery method consists only 1.12 recovery primitives. Due to the sparsity, we list
the total number of two-primitive and three-primitive methods used in each website category in
Table 4.2. None of recovery methods we identified has more than three primitives. Financial and e-
commerce websites deploy such multi-primitive recovery methods more than other websites, possibly
due to their critical service nature. However, with equal importance, email websites do not have a
single recovery method that has more than one primitive.
Table 4.2: Recovery Methods with Multiple Primitives
Primitive Number Routine Tool Spokesman E-commerce Email Financial
2 primitives 6 3 3 8 0 6
3 primitives 0 1 0 1 0 5
Overall, it can be inferred that most of the top websites delegate the security responsibility of
account recovery to email service providers, instead of extending their own security infrastructures.
There could be several reasons for this. First, it keeps high usability, as the registered email address
becomes a centralized master key through which users can conveniently manage almost all of their
online accounts. In other words, users incur almost no more cost when the number of online
accounts increases. Second, email recovery mechanisms can be easily deployed at both sever and
client sides. Third, the security obligation of account recovery is delegated to other online services,
which significantly reduces the security responsibility of the website. Accordingly, the email of a
user ends up as essentially another password manager and thus a potential single point of failure.
The illegal access to an email account can pose a serious security threat on most websites, with
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the only exception being financial websites. As a result, an attacker can easily compromise user
accounts by mounting an account recovery attack, especially nowadays when email accounts are at
a massive loss [4].
4.4 Attack Assessment
Since emails play a critical role in account recovery, it is necessary to evaluate the vulnerability that
may be introduced by emails, especially when user email accounts are at risk.
Although we have observed that most websites rely on emails to recover user passwords, the
assumption that possessing a password will compromise a user account may no longer hold under
today’s multi-dimensional authentication context, where a password may not always be the sole
gatekeeper. In fact, an account recovery attack should be considered successful only if an attacker
can actually log in to the target website and impersonate the victim user, which rules out cases
where the attacker steals a password but fails to access the account due to a lack of other credentials.
We first define the capabilities of an attacker and then discuss the possibility of a successful attack.
4.4.1 Threat Model
We assume that an attacker has access to the victim’s primary email account and attempts to log
in to a user account by exploiting the information included in the recovery email. Specifically, the
attacker has no knowledge about the victim’s personal information and makes no attempt to obtain
the information that is believed discoverable or guessable yet hardly quantitatively assessable, such
as user-chosen usernames (when it is neither the email address nor included in the recovery email) or
security question answers. We also assume that the attacker does not make extra efforts to bypass
additional classifier-based authentication schemes, such as IP address or OS/browser fingerprinting.
Note that we aim to set a baseline for the success rate of an account recovery attack so that we keep
our attack model simple and clean. In the real world, attackers may try to use more sophisticated
tactics to break into even more user accounts [10].
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4.4.2 Possibility to Break-in
As suggested by Table 4.1, 213 out of the 239 websites solely rely on emails to recover user pass-
words, making 89.12% of the examined websites potentially vulnerable to account recovery attacks.
However, an attack may not be successful for two reasons: the lack of other credentials and addi-
tional classifier-based authentication. Thus, these factors should also be taken into consideration
for estimating the success rate of mounting account recovery attacks on these 213 websites. We
discuss the impact of each factor as follows.
4.4.2.1 Lack of Credentials
The first factor is the lack of other credentials, and a user’s password is not the only credential
needed to log in to a system. We investigate the use of a username, as it is also a required piece of
information for successful authentication. A website needs to know a username or an email address
first to locate an account so that the corresponding recovery methods, such as security questions for
the designated user account, can be retrieved. We identify that 80.3% (192 out of 239) of websites
allow the use of email addresses as usernames, and 178 of them can use emails to recover their
passwords. On the other hand, 23 websites that do not treat email address as a type of username
(i.e., a username is freely selected by its user) provide email-based username recovery or directly send
a username in the account recovery email, meaning that the username itself can be accessible from
the email account. Thus, in total, 84.1% (201 out of 239) of the examined websites are potentially
vulnerable to account recovery attacks. In other words, among the 213 websites that allow emails
to recover passwords, 12 of them are immune to account recovery attacks because attackers cannot
know usernames through emails. Another lack-of-credential scenario is the two-factor authentication
(2FA) in which an attacker has no access to the other authentication factor. In this case, the login
will also fail. We found that 35 websites feature 2FA options. However, the general adoption rate
is still believed to be quite low. By analyzing more than 100,000 Google accounts, Petsas et al. [93]
estimated that Google 2FA is adopted by no more than 6.4% of its users in 2015. It is also unlikely
for other websites to have a much higher adoption rate than Google. Furthermore, 2FA is an option
disabled by default in all of the websites we have identified. Therefore, a 2FA-available website
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Table 4.3: Websites Vulnerable to Account Recovery Attacks
All R1 R1&R2 R1&R2&R3
239 213 (89.12%) 201 (84.1%) 194(81.1%)
R1: Allows email as an account recovery method.
R2: Username is directly obtainable. R3: No clas-
sifier is enabled.
should still be considered vulnerable to account recovery attacks since more than 90% of the users
are not really protected.
4.4.2.2 Classification-based Authentication
The other factor taken into account is classification-based authentication. Leveraging more or
de-centralized credentials may incur significant usability hassles and thus repel users. Therefore,
many websites start to use a classifier to automatically verify a legitimate login attempt to balance
usability with security, where a correct password is not sufficient for login. The classifier aims to
detect anomalous login behaviors by taking many signals into the classification decision, such as
the IP address, cookies, and OS/browser fingerprints. Alaca et al. [10] identified and evaluated 29
fingerprinting mechanisms, and each of them may produce multiple signals. If a login attempt is
classified as suspicious, the system is likely to trigger a standard 2FA. Authentication classification
is reported by Google [8] to effectively reduce 99.7% of account compromises using more than 120
features. However, the classification is a black-box that is hard to comprehend, especially when
the features are numerous. To determine whether a website has enabled a classifier, we adopt an
attacker-centric approach, where we probe all 239 websites by using the Tor network and VPN1,
which enables us to emulate an attacker. Specifically, we first train each website by manually logging
in to the website on the same computer once per day for a period of one week. The computer has
a fixed fingerprint and IP address. Then, we camouflage ourselves as a user in a different country
with different operating systems and browsers (all cookies cleared) to log in to the same website
three weeks after the training stage. Note that we have provided necessary information, which
includes a backup email, phone, and security question, for the use of the 2FA to the website when
the classifier has low confidence. Our methodology cannot guarantee 100% accuracy of the results
1The Tor network is known for having abnormal login issues in some websites, so we use both Tor and VPN
to obtain most accurate information.
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since the classification systems of these websites are still unknown. However, we believe that our
results are sufficiently close to the ground truth since a useful classifier should capture such obvious
anomalies. Our results indicate that only 14 (5.9%) out of the 239 websites are using a classifier, as
we are either required to complete a standard 2FA or blocked from logging in. Furthermore, 8 of the
14 websites rank top 30 in web traffic, and the others are mainly financial websites. Clearly, though
useful, classification-based authentication has not been widely used, and thus account recovery
vulnerabilities still remain, at least at the current stage.
After considering the above two factors, we are able to answer the question of how many websites
are vulnerable under such an attack model. We concisely summarize the results in Table 4.3, which
shows that overall, 81.1% of the websites we examined are vulnerable under our threat model.
In addition, if an attacker is sophisticated and could emulate enough login signals to deceive the
classifier, 84.1% of the websites would be vulnerable to account recovery attacks.
4.5 Damage Estimation and Email Security
As a large portion of websites are vulnerable to account recovery attacks when a registered email is
compromised, we evaluate possible damages that could be caused and the security policies of major
email providers, which are essential to throttle attacks on user email accounts.
4.5.1 Damage
The damage can be multi-fold. First, attackers are able to steal private information, such as
home address and activity history of users. In fact, this is the main reason why an attacker is
interested in user passwords. Second, the attacker may also actively impersonate legitimate users
to post information, such as sending spam messages on the user’s behalf [8]. Third, they may cause
financial loss by purchasing products and stealing credit card or bank information. Measuring the
extent of the damage can be complex and error-prone since even the same type of websites could
have very different user data and security policies.
We estimate the possible losses by examining typical websites from four major website groups,
which are routine, tool, spokesman, and e-commerce. We do not examine the email group as
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Egelman et al. [42] have already done a thorough investigation on how much sensitive information
resides in one’s primary email account, reporting that a substantial amount of sensitive information
can be found in the email archive, such as credit card numbers (16%) and SSN (20%). We also
exclude the financial group due to the fact that all of the financial websites we examined in the Alexa
top 500 websites are immune to the account recovery attack, as the email is insufficient to reset a
password. In our examination, we select those websites with a single service type. In addition, we
also try to select these websites that are likely used by normal users. A counter-example is a paid
advertisement publisher, which has a high volume of web traffic, but few normal users would use it.
Table 4.4: Damage Estimation
Site Sensitive Information Activity Financial
R
ou
ti
ne
netflix.com Phone Number, Watch History, Credit Card Number, Credit Card Info Subscribe/Update Service
nytimes.com Name, Location, Purchase History, Occupation, Income, Gender
weather.com Name, Birthday, Gender, Phone Number, Home Address, Work Address
wikia.com Location, Birthday, Name, Gender, Occupation, Posts
To
ol
github.com Company, Location, Credit Card Number, Credit Card Info Sabotage Purchase Service/Data
dropbox.com All Files Stored, Access History Sabotage
skype.com Phone Number, Birthday, Location, Connection’s Phone Number, Birthday, Location, Gender
ebates.com Name, Address, Shopping History Spamming
Sp
ok
es
m
an
facebook.com Name, Address, Birthday, Gender, Work, Education, Phone Number,Contact’s Information, Posts, Messages Spamming, Sabotage
instagram.com Name, Phone, Gender Spamming, Sabotage
reddit.com Private Messages Spamming, Sabotage
quora.com Private Messages Spamming
livejournal.com Birthday, Location, Private Messages, School, Posts Spamming
E
-c
om
m
er
ce amazon.com
Shopping History, Files on Cloud, Name, Address, Phone Number, Private Messages,
Reviews, Browsing History, Credit Card Number, Credit Card Info Purchase Products/Services
ebay.com Name, Gender, Address, Buying History, Selling History, Private Messages, Phone Number, Credit Card Number, Credit Card Info Sabotage Purchase Products*
walmart.com Name, Address, Phone, Shopping History, Credit Card Number, Credit Card Info
gap.com Name, Gender, Address, Phone Number, Shopping History, Credit Card Number Credit Card Info
Red color indicates that the information is fully obtainable while Blue color indicates that the information is only partially obtainable.
* When purchasing a product on Ebay, the user can modify the shipping address without re-inputting payment information.
We show the damage assessment in Table 4.4. It is evident that all of the websites we exam-
ined, to various extents, expose user private information, such as phone numbers, birthdates, and
addresses, to attackers. In addition to private information, an attacker is able to actively mount sub-
sequent attacks, such as sabotaging or spamming. Sabotaging may not be appealing to the attacker
since it does not bring many benefits. However, using a real account for spamming is a common
practice among spammers [8]. Furthermore, attackers may even purchase products in online stores
with stolen payment information. For the attacker to receive the ordered package or intercept the
delivery process, it may need to change the shipping address. We observe that many e-commerce
websites require payment authentication, in terms of the credit card security code (Walmart and
GAP), to post an order. Amazon requires to re-input the complete payment information if the
shipping address is new. However, surprisingly, Ebay allows a user to change the shipping address
freely without additional authentication, which makes financial losses largely possible if the account
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is compromised by attackers.
Table 4.5: Examining Major Email Providers
Provider Region Length Composition 2FA Classifier
Gmail.com USA 8 1
p p
Yahoo.com USA 7-10* 4-1*
p p
Outlook.com USA 8 2
p p
AOL.com USA 8 1
p
QQ.com China 6 1
p
163.com China 6 1
p
Sina.com.cn China 6 1
p¯
**
China.com China 6 1
China.com.cn China 6 1
Rediff.com India 6 1
Yandex.com Russia 8 1
p
* Minimum password length and composition can vary depending on
each other. For example, a password of length 7 must have 4 types of
characters to be accepted by Yahoo. However, a password of length 10
can have only 1 type of character.
** The on/off of the classifier is configurable, and the default is off.
Table 4.6: Password Policies
Routine Spokesman E-commerce Financial Tool Email Overall
Length 5.74 5.54 6.35 7.33 5.91 7.0 5.92
Composition 1.20 1.19 1.57 1.67 1.36 1.18 1.33
For Yahoo.com, we choose a minimum length of 8 and a composition of 2 since this setting may
fit well with more typical passwords.
4.5.2 Assessing Email Security
Since email is pivotal to account recovery, the security of user accounts in a website is heavily
dependent on the email security. A more secure email service can certainly help to thwart account
recovery attacks in the first place.
To this end, we evaluate the security policies of all 11 major email service providers in our
dataset, which span different geo-locations, including North America, Asia, and Europe. The fields
examined involve several authentication policies, including minimum password length, minimum
password composition (uppercase letters, lowercase letters, digits, and special characters), whether
2FA is provided, and whether a classifier is used to filter out abnormal login attempts. The list of
providers we examined and results are shown in Table 4.5.
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We also list the password policies of all six types of websites in Table 4.6, with respect to
minimum password length and minimum types of characters required (on average). We can see that
the minimum length of passwords in email websites is seven, which is only less than that of financial
websites. However, email websites have the weakest composition complexity policy, since most of
them do not require more than one type of character in a password, and users are more likely to
create predictable passwords under such a policy.
We also notice that a significant portion of email providers include 2FA functionalities in their
authentication systems. Compared to the overall rate of 2FA-enabled websites, email providers show
a much higher security concerns and offer 2FA enhancement to secure user accounts. However, the
number of users that actually use 2FA is likely to be small [93]. A more effective solution might be
using a classifier to verify a legitimate authentication attempt. Although some of the classification
signals can be easily spoofed [10], it is still difficult for an attacker to correctly spoof all signals
considered by the classifier, especially when the adopted signals are unknown [22]. Unfortunately,
only 4 out of the 11 email providers have integrated such a protection mechanism. One of them
(sina.com.cn) requires a user to turn on the classifier, but most users probably do not enable it
as the default setting is off. The other 7 email providers are much easier to be compromised by
phishing attacks and password guessing/cracking attacks. Under such a condition, those accounts
that are associated with a weak email account are vulnerable to account recovery attacks.
Generally speaking, a large portion of major email service providers fail to provide adequate
security protection on user email accounts. It makes an account recovery attack more likely to
happen, and thus jeopardizes the security of the online accounts that rely on emails for account
recovery.
4.6 Securing Email-based Account Recovery
It is not an uncommon scenario that an email provider and its users fail to adequately protect
their email accounts. Thus, an email account compromise could trigger massive compromises of
other accounts that use emails for recovery. To mitigate account recovery attacks, we propose a
lightweight Secure Email Account Recovery (SEAR) protocol that can be seamlessly integrated into
74
current network infrastructures. SEAR does not attempt to change the current email-based account
recovery model, but instead, it aims to prevent attackers from recovering other account passwords
if an email account is compromised. SEAR requires little effort from a website and its users. In
short, SEAR requires a 2FA only when an account recovery email needs to be opened. Meanwhile,
the normal email checking experience remains unchanged.
4.6.1 SEAR Specification
The core of SEAR is to add a header in an email to indicate that the email is for account recovery
purposes. This method is transparent to existing email infrastructures since Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP) allows users to customize headers. The basic workflow of SEAR is simple. The
account provider (i.e., the website where an account recovery is undergoing) will add a header
“tag:value" pair (we choose “Recover:1") in the recovery email, and upon receiving an email with
the recovery header, the email provider will require the recipient to re-authenticate itself via a
second channel in order to access the recovery email’s content.
While our solution is straightforward in principle, there are practical challenges that should be
carefully addressed. In particular, the current email-fetching protocols (IMAP or POP3) do not
protect any specific emails. In other words, the user’s mail user agent (MUA), such as Thunderbird,
Outlook, and Yahoo! Mail, will fetch whatever emails belonging to the recipient from the Mail
Delivery Agent (MDA) of the email provider, without supporting any additional authentication
process. Under this emailing infrastructure, it is infeasible to protect any specific emails. To
address this challenge, we attempt to protect the recovery email content, instead of the email itself,
through the use of an “intermediate token." Specifically, the email provider intercepts the recovery
email content and replaces it with an intermediate token. Thus, the recipient will only receive the
token. Then, when the recipient opens the recovery email, the intermediate token should be sent
back to the email provider by the recipient to initiate the re-authentication. The token submission
can be done in different ways, e.g., clicking a URL that embeds the token as in our implementation
(see Figure 4.2a). The email provider will release the content of the original recovery email only
if the re-authentication is successful. Furthermore, to ensure the legitimacy of recovery emails, we
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Figure 4.2: Account Recovery Examples.
(a) Actual recovery email
(b) Email content from the account provider
enforce the use of the Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) [33] protocol, which uses public-key
cryptography to ensure the legitimacy of the sender and has already been deployed on more than
80% emails as reported by Google [41].
Overall, SEAR incurs little user experience change since it only requires a second authentication
factor in the rare case when a user needs to reset or recover a password. More importantly, it
can be seamlessly integrated into today’s emailing infrastructures and MDAs. Moreover, it is fully
backward-compatible. When one or both email parties do not comply with SEAR, a recovery email
will be treated as a normal email.
4.6.2 Implementation
We implement SEAR on well-known open-source projects to demonstrate its simplicity and com-
patibility. SEAR requires minor modifications on the account provider and email provider sides to
meet its specification. We use two Amazon EC2 Ubuntu server instances [1] to act as the account
provider and email provider, respectively. They both run Postfix [7], a widely adopted open-source
Mail Transfer Agent (MTA). We use Mutt [80], a text-based email agent to generate recovery emails.
The legitimacy of emails is protected via openDKIM [6]. On the email provider side, we modify
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the “clean-up" procedure in Postfix source code to feature recovery header checking and subsequent
actions. We use a URL to embed the intermediate token, such that the user can directly click the
URL to submit the token to the email provider. A sample of email received by the user is shown in
Figure 4.2a. The page pointed to by the URL requires a second authentication. If successful, the
recovery email content is displayed on the webpage, as shown in Figure 4.2b. The user can then
directly reset a password through the URL on this protected page in a conventional manner.
SEAR induces little overhead for two reasons. First, only a small fraction of emails are account
recovery emails. By examining different everyday email accounts, we roughly estimate that account
recovery emails make up 0.4% of all emails. All other emails are processed normally. Second,
its implementation does not introduce any expensive operations. Even in major email providers’
distributed systems, it will not introduce any bottleneck. All modules used by SEAR are mature
techniques, which have been extensively tested and used for other purposes. The storage overhead
is also negligible since the extra data stored are just the intermediate tokens, which can be as small
as 20 bytes in our implementation.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate account recovery at popular websites by examining their recovery
protocols. Through extensive analysis of the security features of those websites, we observe that
92.5% of them rely on emails to reset user passwords. Even worse, the user accounts in a significant
portion (81.1%) of the websites we reviewed can be easily compromised by mounting an email recov-
ery attack. However, many email service providers fail to realize such security threats and have not
yet taken serious actions to protect recovery emails, leading to a single point of failure of using email
for account recovery. To mitigate this problem, we introduce a lightweight Secure Email Account
Recovery (SEAR) mechanism to provide extra protection on account recovery emails. SEAR can
be seamlessly integrated into modern email infrastructures with a full backward-compatibility.
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Chapter 5
UTrack: Enterprise User Tracking Based
on OS-Level Audit Logs
5.1 Introduction
Nowadays, cyber-attacks have been becoming more sophisticated and stealthy. In an Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT) attack, on average an attacker may lurk in the target network for more
than half a year, escalating and maintaining the access privilege without being caught [110]. As
a result, there is an increasing demand of user tracking inside an enterprise network, in order to
improve the visibility for the network monitoring, and help security analysts to make informed
decisions on the detection of insider, targeted, or APT attacks. A recently enabled paradigm in
the security industry, called User Behavior Analytics (UBA) [5,109], is built upon this foundation.
UBA categorizes a range of techniques that keep monitoring user activities and identifying those
that deviate from normal user sessions. While UBA is a rather broad concept that can be applied
to many scenarios on a different level, granularity, and scope, its fundamental building block is to
accurately identify and model user activities. Capturing user activities inaccurately or incompletely
could result in incorrect detection or analysis, and even render a UBA system useless.
Towards more accurate user modeling and verification, contemporary UBA approaches attempt
to fuse data from different data sources for creating a more comprehensive risk profile [101, 111].
Though useful in many scenarios [101,109,111], an inherent limitation is that they all lack a holistic
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view on systems since data are collected from only a couple of security-sensitive applications, such
as firewalls and proxies. Under such a setting, many meaningful events could be missed, not to
mention the difficulties of correlating data with different syntax and semantics from a variety of
sources. A natural approach would be to leverage log data at the operating system (OS) level, which
can record data for all applications under homogeneous syntax and comprehensible semantics. Such
an audit log system is widely deployed in many security infrastructures [69, 70, 74, 78, 79], mainly
for forensics purposes.
In this project, we develop a novel user tracking system named UTrack by leveraging the rich
system log data to universally monitor user session activities. Our ultimate goal is to present a
user session profile that is accurate in tracking user activities and concise in the output report.
We identify and tackle two major challenges. The first is to bridge the semantic gap between user
accounts and human users in both in-host and cross-host scenarios. This is done by tracking causal
relationship among processes through the user session root and correlating network events to identify
network control channels. The second challenge is to address the “needle in a haystack” problem
stemmed from the huge volume of log data through a variety of data reduction techniques. Unlike
many previous works on log data reduction [75, 122] that target at information-lossless reduction,
our data pruning approach is to prune data that may carry meaningful information but are out of
the scope of user activity tracking.
We deploy UTrack in an enterprise network that comprises more than 100 hosts running either
Windows or Linux operating systems with real users. We manage to process log data from all the
hosts on a single machine, and demonstrate that UTrack is able to accurately identify and concisely
present the events that represent activities of a real user inside the network in a human-consumable
fashion.
In summary, we make the following contributions.
1. We develop a new universal user tracking mechanism (UTrack) based on OS-level audit logs.
UTrack aims to bridge the semantic gap between human users and computer user accounts by
identifying and associating system events that appear in different user accounts and different
hosts but belong to a single user session.
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2. We apply effective data reduction methods on user session profiles to achieve a scalable and
salient presentation. The reduction mainly involves detecting interactive processes and mod-
eling common data patterns.
3. We implement UTrack in a real enterprise environment, with data collected from more than
100 hosts. Our evaluation results show that UTrack is accurate and concise in presenting user
activities. UTrack scales well with a low resource consumption.
5.2 Motivations and Challenges
5.2.1 Motivations
Contemporary user behavior monitoring is mostly done on disparate applications and services.
However, such a methodology has drawbacks that limit the usability of the monitoring system. The
first drawback is the lack of completeness. In these systems, only a small portion of user activities
are recorded and analyzed, since the logs are only generated from applications that are usually
perceived to be of strong security indication, for instance, a firewall, a web proxy, or a sensitive
database service. All other user activities are not actively monitored. However, a successful attack,
especially an APT attack, usually comprises many individual steps. The traces of each step may
be buried in seemingly less interesting events that are not recorded by applications. By connecting
these dots, one may detect an intrusion that cannot be identified by conventional user behavior
analytics. In contemporary user tracking schemes, the auditor lacks this holistic view on the entire
system.
The other limitation is the difficulty of correlating log data. Data collected from different
services and applications may be of different formats, granularity, and semantic levels. Parsing
and correlating data from different sources is very challenging. As a result, data from individual
sources are independently handled and analyzed in many cases. Shashanka et al. [101] attempted
to associate subjects from different data sources, such as different IP addresses and user accounts.
However, the capability of such an association is limited to a small scope, where the subjects are
tightly bounded. Therefore, the inspector lacks view on the connections among critical pieces of
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puzzle from all data sources.
System Opportunities: A universal user activity tracking system, which monitors activities
of all users inside an enterprise network, is very useful to resolve or mitigate the aforementioned
problems. However, recording all activities of individual users in the entire network may incur
significant system overhead. To balance the trade-off between system overhead and data granularity,
we leverage an OS level log system to collect data from each host inside a network. The OS level
log system collects low level system objects, such as processes, files, and network connections,
which largely preserve the running states of a computer at a certain time. Thus, it can be used
to accurately reconstruct the causality among objects with clean semantics. Meanwhile, the data
volume is at a manageable level. Nowadays, many enterprises have deployed such a log system for
forensics purposes [69,70,74, 78, 79].
5.2.2 Challenges
5.2.2.1 Accurate Modeling of User Behaviors
When processing audit logs, a user account is often considered equivalent to the user itself. This is
mostly true in some high-level network applications, such as Facebook and Twitter. However, this
assumption no longer holds when it comes to low-level OS events.
Unlike application-specific logging that is clearly defined and has much higher semantic aware-
ness, a generic OS-level log system monitors events with respect to individual user accounts. In an
enterprise network, a user may have multiple user accounts, and a user account could be accessible
by multiple users. For instance, a network administrator could access both its personal account
and the root account on a web server. The web server may also be managed by several system
administrators. As observed in our network, the discrepancy mainly comes from the following three
scenarios.
Account Transition: Managing account privilege and ensuring proper isolation among differ-
ent privilege levels are essential to an operating system. However, user accounts with lower privileges
sometimes need higher privileges to accomplish certain tasks, and it is mainly accomplished in two
ways, namely, setting the UID of a process (e.g., “ping” command) or having a higher privilege ac-
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count to do the task (e.g., through “sudo” or “su” commands). Thus, a simple task done by a single
user may involve several user accounts, and the same account may also be involved in activities
performed by multiple users. Furthermore, one user account granted the root privilege is able to
interact with the system on any other account’s behalf. Though this does not usually happen in
normal operations, it is possible when an attacker exploits this system trait to mask its malicious
behaviors.
System Service: In a typical operating system, there are many applications and services run-
ning in the background. Meanwhile, many system accounts are created to achieve a finer granularity
of access control for those services. Although these accounts do not represent any individual user,
they are delegated to perform certain tasks by other users. For example, when the PostgreSQL
database server receives a request to access the database, the server daemon creates a child process
to process the request. Therefore, all access activities at the database server are recorded as from
the account “postgres”, regardless of the real user that is in fact accessing the database.
Credential Sharing: It is possible that the same account is shared among multiple real users.
A typical scenario is the “root” account on a server, which may be managed and shared by several
developers or administrators.
In general, there exists a semantic gap between user accounts and human users. It is no reliable
to solely rely on the user accounts to track the behavior of a user, due to the lack of proper linkage of
user account transition and service account delegation. After realizing this semantic gap, we develop
our user tracking system by clearly setting boundaries between the two concepts - the term “user”
always indicates a real human user, and the term “account” always indicates a user (or system)
account in a computer system.
5.2.2.2 Identifying Data Triggered by Users
The other challenge we face is to sift out data that are directly related to user behaviors. We
observe that only a small portion of log data are triggered by direct user interactions with the
computer, and others are spontaneous or scheduled system events, such as automatic updater and
cron jobs. Since human interactions are the natural target of a user tracking system, we attempt
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to identify system events that are triggered by users’ actual interactions in order to achieve a much
higher scalability and remove unnecessary distractions from security auditors. However, OS level
log systems usually only record the causal relationships among primitive system objects, such as
processes, files, and sockets, to gain clean data semantics and conserve system resource. They do
not usually keep track of the operations on I/O devices, such as a click on the mouse or a tap on
the keyboard. Without such information, it becomes non-trivial to identify events stemmed from
users’ interactions. To achieve our goal, we follow the lineage of the UI management components to
identify possible processes that have an open interface to the users and rely on many useful features
to determine interactive processes.
We also need to address the semantic gap between the actual high-level user behaviors and low-
level system interpretations. In many cases, a simple operation from a user may result in a large
number of system events; however, most system events are highly repetitive and predictable, and
thus carry little information. To eliminate this redundancy, we model the file sets that are frequently
accessed by processes, and only record the events that do not fit in the model. In addition, we model
repetitive execution “branches” of a process and compress the repetitive ones.
5.3 System Overview
Nowadays, many organizations have started to deploy an agent on each host in their enterprise
networks. UTrack works under the same context of these forensics-purposed OS level log systems.
Three types of system objects (process, files, and network sockets) and their interaction events
(e.g., a process creating a child process or reading from a file) are recorded. Each event also carries
attributes that describe the activity, such as the event time, user account, file pathnames, and socket
IP addresses, etc.
UTrack aims to help a system auditor to understand the activities of users inside an inter-
connected enterprise network by associating both in-host and cross-host activities performed by the
same user in a specific user session. The input to UTrack is a data stream collected from all hosts,
and it can be either a real-time stream or an offline history database. Generally, it consumes the
data from a start time (Ts) to an end time (Te), and outputs user session profiles to describe the
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activities of a user session within the time period. If the data is an online stream, the end time Te
is set to a distant future time. The user session profile is represented in a forest structure, and the
time is usually set in terms of weeks, days, or hours in different use cases.
Most forensics techniques consider a system object, such as an identified trojan process, as a
Point of Interest (POI), and aim at understanding the provenance or impact of POIs. In con-
trast, UTrack attempts to understand the behavior of a user in a session. In other words, the user
itself is the POI. In most cases, the behavior of a user is much more complex to describe than
a single attack incidence in the system. Similarly or even worse, UTrack suffers from the same
data explosion problem, which makes it difficult to focus on the real interesting events. Thus, it is
imperative for UTrack to identify and keep the most relevant data, which can also help save system
resource.
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Figure 5.1 illustrates an overview of UTrack. UTrack consumes a data stream of log events from
the aggregator, which receives, sorts, and sends out the data from the agent-enabled hosts. The
first task of UTrack is to construct user session profiles by correlating both in-host and cross-host
activities, mainly relying on the process lineage and network event matching. However, this session
profile contains a large amount of system-generated data that may not be directly related to the
user’s operations, but can easily overwhelm other interesting events. To mitigate this issue, we
apply interactiveness detection on the user session profile to identify the processes that have actual
interaction with the user. This step directs us to the events that are more relevant to user tracking.
We also model the files, network connections, and “sub-branches” of the interactive processes to
further compress the low-entropy events. The output of this step is a more salient session profile,
which can be directly construed by human auditors or be inputted to further security measures.
UTrack works in an online fashion. It gradually builds the user session profiles while consuming
system events on the fly. It is important for a UBA system to promptly analyze the data, so that
anomalies can be identified in their early stage and triaged to prevent further damages. On the
other hand, UTrack can also work offline in forensics analysis by reconstructing the data stream
from the log database. In order to facilitate this feature, we build a data replayer to replay the
history data from the database, which is detailed in Section 5.6. This data replaying tool is also
useful on implementing, debugging, and evaluating our user tracking system.
Note that UTrack does not aim to replace conventional forensics techniques, such as backtracking
or forward tracking. Instead, it is indeed complementary to those techniques to better secure an
enterprise network. Nowadays, it is a common case that people do not really make good use of big
data, and a large amount of collected data remain in the warehouse without generating any useful
insights. UTrack demonstrates a new perspective to better leverage the collected rich system data
for system security and management purposes.
5.4 UTrack Event Association
UTrack is capable of tracking users across an enterprise network by linking events from different
hosts. Note that we no longer depend on the owner of the process (i.e. the user account) to determine
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the real performer of an event. Instead, the process owner is only used as side information to give
a hint of who the performer might be. In the following, we first introduce the tracking mechanism
on a single host and then extend it to the cross-host scenarios.
5.4.1 Tracking In-host User Activities
5.4.1.1 Process Lineage
Modern operating systems usually maintain all alive processes in a tree structure. For example,
in Linux, every process, except the init process, is forked by a parent process. This parent-child
relationship widely exists among processes and is useful to determine the performer of most system
activities. Specifically, we consider the user of the child processes to be the same as that of the
parent process, unless we have a special reason to cut the lineage and attribute the parent and
children to different sessions. For instance, a user might open a Bash terminal and run the “ls”
command in the terminal. Since the “ls” command is executed by a child process forked by the bash
process, UTrack considers both processes to be performed by a single user.
This parent-child relationship is a fundamental building block of many forensics analysis tech-
niques [69, 70, 74, 79], which usually expand the investigation from POI, i.e., the detected point of
an attack. Timing is also considered to mitigate the possible dependency explosion and find the
most relevant events. In contrast, UTrack tracks all the parent-child relationships among processes
for constructing a more complete user session model.
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We do not keep track of file data control flows, which are usually considered in forensics tech-
niques. This is because when a process has written to a file, the file has a causal relationship
with all the processes that read the file afterwards; however, this causal relationship is out of the
scope of user tracking where the user activities are the target. Furthermore, it introduces too many
dependencies that may unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
5.4.1.2 User Log-on Sessions
Since one OS usually structures all its processes in a tree (or forest in Windows), when activities
from multiple users are recorded in a host, it is far from adequate to solely rely on the process
lineage for tracking each user. Thus, we must find a way to attribute related nodes to different
users. A critical observation is that a user must have an interface to interact with the computer,
and usually the first step is to log on the computer for user authentication. In addition, the OS
usually organizes the processes under one user log-on session in a tree structure, and normally there
is a root node as the ancestor of all processes created in the user session. We call this node a
session root. Figure 5.2 shows an example of Linux instance. Each user logging in the system has a
corresponding session root (i.e., node s1 and node s2), which is usually a child process of a running
service. Their activities (for instance, open an application) are reflected in the subtrees under the
session root. UTrack utilizes session roots to identify the activities of each user. It brings us two
benefits. First, it helps to separate processes and activities triggered by users from those generated
by the OS or system services. Second, it can differentiate activities among multiple users who have
logged on the host simultaneously.
UTrack identifies session roots from several known patterns. For a normal user, the most common
way to interact with the computer is via a Graphic User Interface (GUI). Even command line
interactions are included since the terminal window itself is created in the desktop environment.
For example, in Linux, the X display manager (a process usually named *dm) manages the login
screen and organizes a user session in child process. In our experimental environment, the most
common display manager is lightdm, and thus the session root in this case is a lightdm session child
with a session ID. When users log on a server through virtual consoles or no X server is available on
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the server, the session root is /sbin/login, which is a child of the system init process. It is even easier
for Windows, as it is a GUI-based OS and the user interaction with the OS is usually through the
GUI. We determine the windows process “winlogon” as the session root, since it initiates the user
authentication process and becomes the root of the desktop environment when the login succeeds.
Remote logins, such as through ssh and telnet, are envisioned as user cross-host activities since
events from multiple hosts need to be correlated to track the relations. We elaborate how we handle
cross-host activities in Section 5.4.2. When logins are from hosts that do not have an agent installed
or the login happens before the tracking start time Ts, we identify session roots based on the service
pattern. For example, the ssh daemon creates a dedicated shell for whoever has successfully logged
on the computer via ssh. As such, the dedicated shell is considered as the session root.
5.4.2 Tracking Cross-host User Activities
In an enterprise network with many inter-connected hosts, one user may need to work on other hosts
or request resources and services from servers. It is critical to track the cross-host user activities
in order to achieve a better coverage than local-only tracking. A number of previous works have
been done to help understand how a request is processed in a complex distributed system using
middleware or application level instrumentation [16, 108], statistical inference [12, 96], or system
call log and analysis techniques [98, 106]. However, they all cannot accurately work under generic-
purposed OS logs.
We propose to track cross-host user activities based on one key observation that after receiving
remote requests, a server will act on behalf of the requester. Most servers have a daemon listening to
incoming requests and processing the requests accordingly. There are two types of server architec-
tures, namely, event-driven servers and worker-based servers. For the event-driven servers, since a
thread could handle multiple incoming requests in a non-blocking, interleaving manner, it is hard to
correlate a remote request with the corresponding activities of the server without specific assistance
from the server. Therefore, our main focus is on the worker-based servers, where a network request
is solely handled by a worker. Worker-based servers are popularly used in enterprise networks with
a moderate number of users due to the ease of coding and maintenance. A worker-based server may
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support two working modes, namely, on-demand worker creation and a pre-allocated worker pool.
As an example of the first mode, sshd daemon accepts a remote network connection, and creates an
interactive command language interpreter process, such as a bash terminal. Thereafter, the newly
created command interpreter process is controlled by the requester, and any activities performed
by the process should be attributed to the requester, regardless of the user account that owns it on
the server. We call this process a delegate of the remote user.
It is more tricky to handle the worker pool mode. In UTrack, one process node in a user session
completely belongs to the user. However, it does not fit well with the mode of a worker pool, where
multiple long-living workers are pre-created and each worker only dedicates a partial of its lifetime
for a network request. In order to accommodate such a case, we introduce a new notation – virtual
process – to model a span of the worker’s lifetime. When a worker begins to work on a requester,
we create a new node (i.e., the virtual process) in the user’s model, and the new node records all
the activities of the worker during this time. We illustrate this process in Figure 5.3, where two
users make requests to a server at different times. The server dispatches the same worker to access
two different files, f1 and f2. A virtual node is created to represent the time lapse that a worker is
processing each request. Eventually, the user model is constructed with each user associated with
its own virtual process, which carries all data during the time when the real worker handles the
individual request.
To track cross-host user activities, the first step is to find the communication channel between
the server application (i.e., responder) and the user-controlled application (i.e., requester). Next,
we try to identify a worker for the request using a rule-based method. In both worker modes, we
observe that after establishing a network channel as a connection acceptor, a child process or a
sibling (when the listener and workers are siblings) of the server process immediately accesses the
same network channel and generates a number of events. Based on this pattern, we can determine
the worker and attribute all the activities of the worker to the remote requester.
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5.4.3 System Cold Start
UTrack consumes data from agents during a pre-set time period to help understand the user sessions;
however, it may encounter the cold start problem, namely, the history data is not available and the
agents report events on scattered processes. If so, the linkage among processes may be missing. Since
UTrack relies on the causal relations to identify user sessions, it requires to reconstruct these relations
between processes. To address this problem, the agent periodically collects a system snapshot
that stores the child-parent relationship among them. We use this information to reconstruct the
causality relations among stand-alone processes and further extract user sessions in the reconstructed
process tree. Note that the parent-child relationship recorded in the snapshot may not be coherent
with that generated by UTrack, due to possible process delegation, user session identification and
isolation, or the adoption of orphaned processes, etc. This discrepancy is in fact beneficial to our
user tracking scheme. For instance, if a user starts a system service during the tracking period, the
system service is regarded spawned by the user, and the activities of the service can be attributed
to the user. However, if the tracking period is after the system start time and the service daemon is
adopted by the “init” process, then the service becomes a part of the operating system and cannot
represent any user. As such, we only reconstruct the parent-child relationship when the child process
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has no existing parent in the UTrack model.
5.4.4 Scope
UTrack aims to connect events that are cross-host and cross-accounts. However, there are cases
where UTrack cannot handle. For instance, it could fail to identify causality among processes due
to inability to track IPC mechanisms, such as shared memory and shared files. It also cannot
handle the event-driven servers, like those run NGINX. Similar limitations can be found in previous
works [17,98,106].
5.5 Pinpointing User Activities
After correlating activities of users regardless of the process owner, UTrack collects user session
profiles that keep track of all processes, files, and sockets in the memory during the entire tracking
period. As a result, the generated data can become very large, and interesting events may be buried
in piles of less-relevant data. Therefore, it is essential for UTrack to identify and keep only relevant
and useful events. Redundant data must be pruned to release the pressure of huge system resource
demand and to keep the security auditor from unnecessary distractions.
When conducting data pruning, we stick to the user-centric mentality by sifting out the events
that are directly related to the user’s interaction with the computer system. This is because that a
user session profile contains a collection of processes that are only used to facilitate user or system
operations. For example, Ubuntu provides a number of tools and services, such as GNOME Virtual
File System(gvfs) for I/O abstraction, update-notifier for newer version checking, zeitgeist for logging
user activities, etc., which are less relevant to user’s actual behaviors. In contrast, interactive
processes are the processes that a user interact with, such as a Bash shell or UI-based programs
like Firefox, Notepad, etc. The behavior of interactive processes is likely a genuine reflection of the
user operations. However, it is a challenge to identify those interactive processes from our OS level
logging information, which does not include any user actions, such as mouse clicking or keyboard
input. We relies on passive observation and prediction to find interactive processes, and multiple
features have been identified to help distinguish interactive processes from other processes.
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In addition to the interaction-oriented sifting, the data can be further compressed due to the
highly repetitive patterns found in processes and files. We observe that the interactive processes are
prune to generate sub-processes “branches” for different tasks. These branches could be similar to
each other, regarding to the executable names, arguments, and files that are read. In many cases,
these monotonous data can easily dominate a session profile and occupy over 90% data of the user
profile. To address this issue, we model both the activities of an interactive process and the common
files that are read by each executable, which significantly reduce the complexity of the user session
profile.
5.5.1 Interactiveness Detection
The purpose of interactiveness detection is to find user-triggered events. We consider user-triggered
events to be events directly resulting from a user action, such as opening a file using Notepad, etc.
It should be noted that technically, all events are results of human user activities, since background
procedures and processes, even the operating systems are installed by the user. However, since
these processes are mostly regulated and expose behaviors dual to bots, we consider them to be
non-user-triggered. Conceptually, we envision this procedure being similar to find bots/crawlers
in a network, where the bots are essentially programmed by human users, but they expose very
different behaviors and have little relation to active genuine users.
The interactiveness detection relies on passive observation of the OS events, so it faces several
noteworthy challenges. First, passive observation is believed to be less accurate than active detection
solutions, such as Catpcha [103,117]. Second, we do not have a specially tailored log system as those
used in bot detection [48,118], or any side information such as social graph [28,35,48,116]. Lastly,
system level events are low-level data whose semantic meanings are harder to derive. Sometimes,
we need to associate other related events to truly understand the actual user operations.
To categorize unknown processes, we develop a machine learning approach that uses a number
of useful features to distinguish an interactive process from other processes. Note that we need to
keep the actual activities that are usually represented by child processes of an interactive process.
For example, an interactive shell may run many commands, which is executed transiently. These
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commands are not considered interactive processes. However, they represent the user’s activities
and should be studied.
We introduce to use a new feature on the entropy of activity batches. A fundamental observation
is that the interactive processes have irregular activities due to human involvement, so a process
performing tasks at a fixed time interval is unlikely to be controlled by a real human user. However,
treating each individual event as a task is problematic since a single task usually constitutes many
steps and events. As a solution, we preprocess all events that are generated by the process to form
a group of event batches, in which each batch represents a high-level task or operation. A batch
consists of a group of events where each pair of adjacent events has an inter-arrival time of less
than a threshold T . T should be carefully selected since it may result in putting all events into a
single huge batch when it is too large, or losing the causality among events that are generated from
a single task when it is too small.
We envision the time interval between two consecutive activity batches as a random process and
decide if a random process is regular by computing the entropy rate based on empirically learned
probability distribution [32,47]. UTrack computes only the first order and second order entropy. It
is expensive to calculate even higher order entropy, which may need prior knowledge to determine
a probability distribution. Also, we observe that the first and second order entropy can achieve a
satisfactory result.
5.5.2 Non-interactive Process Pruning
Instead of targeting at information-lossless pruning [75,122], we can afford to remove less interesting
data points when coping with our specific goal of user activity tracking. However, it does not mean
we do not track other processes. Actually, we keep track of all alive processes that have any
interaction with interactive processes or become interactive processes. The processes we pruned are
those that do not have any lineage with an interactive process. In general, most processes that are
not in a user session are pruned since they are system-triggered events.
For the processes in a user session, if they are not related to any user interactions, they are also
pruned. We develop an online algorithm to prune those processes using a bottom up, and backward
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propagation method. The pruning starts from the leaf process when the process is ended. If the
leaf process can be pruned, it is removed from the child list of the parent process, and the parent
process will be further checked to see if it can be pruned after the removal of its child process.
5.5.3 Data Modeling
The essence of identifying interactive processes is to find the activities of processes, since they are
likely the direct results of the user’s operations. Therefore, all activities of the interactive processes
are preserved in our user session profile. Due to its long-living and interactive nature, an interactive
process usually has many sub-process branches representing user activities. However, these branches
could be highly repetitive due to multiple reasons. First, even interactive processes may have
periodic routines for updating, synchronization, etc. Second, user activities can be repeated. For
instance, a user may run “ls” command many times in a terminal, and many commands intrinsically
invokes “ls”. Third, there is a large gap between user operations and the interpretations of the
computer system. Therefore, a single, seemingly atomic user operation may result in a large amount
of low-level events. For example, when opening a Firefox browser, we observe that a significant
portion of events are repetitive to serve the same low-level purpose, such as checking the system
time or OS version.
There is a large room for the improvement on salience of a user session profile by modeling and
compressing the files accessed by processes and the branches of interactive processes, respectively.
Based on the observation that many processes with the same executable name and same arguments
(e.g., Chrome.exe type=renderer . . . , we call them “mainexec”) may access a similar set of files, we
are able to model commonly accessed files under a mainexec, and record only the difference. An
example is shown in Figures 5.4(a) and 5.4(b). We notice that both mainexecs e1 and e2 access
a common set of files ({f1, f2, f3}), which can be abstracted by a model (m1). This model-based
technique has also been used in Arnold [40] to reduce instrumentation overhead.
Figures 5.4(c) and 5.4(d) show that the session profile can be further compressed if some branches
are identical. Interactive processes often have identical branches that could easily overwhelm the au-
ditor. Therefore, we can compress these identical branches by only recording the timing information
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and the number of occurrences.
5.6 Implementation and Evaluation
5.6.1 Experiment Environment
We deploy UTrack on 111 hosts of a real enterprise environment, 21 Linux hosts and 90 Windows
hosts. An agent is installed in each host to collect and report system events. UTrack itself is written
in Java and contains 8.3K LoC. We evaluate the performance of UTrack based on one month of
data. Within this period, more than 4 billion events are generated, where 1.65 billion events come
from Windows hosts and 2.41 billion events come from Linux hosts. To facilitate the use of history
data, we implement a data replayer to replay the data recorded and stored in the database with
their original timestamps. With the assistance of the replayer, we are able to replay the one-month
data within 30 hours.
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5.6.2 User Tracking
In our one month experiment, we identify 507 user sessions across 111 hosts. Note that the login
screen itself is counted as a user session and excluded from our data. Among the total 507 user
sessions, only 61 of them are Linux sessions. One reason is that Linux users are less likely to log
off or restart their computers than Windows users. Besides, there exist 4 Linux hosts that do not
have any user sessions, which means that they are used as servers and no one logs on the hosts
through the Linux desktop environment. However, the activities in those servers may be correlated
to user sessions in other hosts. On average, each user session lasts 4.6 day. We also observe that
Linux sessions are significantly longer (9.1 days) than Windows sessions (3.9 days). More than 100
sessions last beyond the one month period, so they are excluded when we compute the average
session lifespans.
For cross-host tracking, we first identify the communication channels. We correlate network
events from all hosts by matching 5-tuple attributes, which include local IP, remote IP, local port,
remote port, and the network protocol. However, due to port or IP recycling, two network events
might be wrongly matched. To avoid such a situation, we add a constraint that two matching
events should happen within a small time window. This small window should consider the possible
errors caused by asynchronous clocks on different hosts and network resource recycling. In our
implementation, we set the time window to 60 seconds, and we recycle the unpaired events after
this time window.
In our environment, the number of all ready-to-pair network events stabilizes at around 20,000
to 25,000. We observe that only around 12.3% of network events can be eventually paired, and
most of the matched network events (82.4%) are localhost channels. This is reasonable because
any communication to the outside world cannot be paired as the other side does not have an agent.
Even the internal communication may not be identified, since not all computers host an agent in our
environment. Another case is the broadcast network events, which have multiple receivers. When
the server is working in the worker-pool mode, it may take a non-negligible time to determine the
delegated worker, since it needs to go through a network channel matching process. If a worker
is found, a virtual process will be created for the requester. However, before the virtual process
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Table 5.1: Servers with the Most Network Connections
ranking Program Name Number of Instances User Instance Mode Host Type
1 sshd 134,492 671 Create New Linux
2 smbd 8,120 428 Create New Linux
3 Postgres 5,152 559 Create New Windows&Linux
4 sendmail 1,218 17 Create New Linux
5 httpd 874 841 Worker Pool Linux
is created, the network request may have already been partially or entirely handled, because most
requests are handled very quickly. Thus, one should record the mapping between the virtual node
and the actual node, and migrate the stand-out events to the virtual node once the delegation
relation is established.
During the one-month experiment, we observe more than 186 programs that accept network
connections, and the top 5 programs are listed in Table 5.1. The “Number of Instances” column
shows the total number of request processing instances we observed. In our environment, since a
server frequently runs ”ss” to localhost for system backup, we observe a large number of ssh events.
We also find a Postgres database that constantly stores new data from network connections. An
Apache server runs the default pre-fork Multi-Processing Module (MPM) to support a worker pool.
The “User Instance” column indicates the instances that belong to a user session. It shows only
a small portion of the cross-host activities can be seen in a user session, since most of the virtual
process nodes are pruned due to their irrelevance to user activities.
5.6.3 User-centric Activity Tracking
To detect interactive processes, we employ an important feature, the “regularity” of activities, which
is measured by the first and second order entropy rates on the inter-arrival time of activity batches
in a process. In our implementation, we empirically set the threshold of batching (T ) as 350 ms.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the CDF of the number of batches a process have when doing the interaction
detection, and the number of events a batch has. Both of them are heavily tailed. For clarity,
we limit the x axis to be within 100. We observe that 70.7% processes have only one batch, and
99.1% processes have fewer than 100 batches. Similarly, more than 78% of batches have fewer than
5 events, and 97% of batches have fewer than 100 events. When computing the entropy of the
process, we round the interval to second-granularity to mitigate noise.
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Table 5.2: Classification Results
Interactive Non-interactive Total
Classified as Interactive 447 (TP) 181 (FP) 628
Classified as Non-Interactive 5 (FN) 25,746 (TN) 25,751
Total 452 25,927
Another important feature we use is the lifespan of a process, which describes the time duration
from the time the process is created to the time it is ended (or the current time if it is still alive at
the time of decision making). The lifespan is a strong indicator of an interactive process. Due to
the communicative nature, interactive processes tend to live longer than other processes. Therefore,
a large amount of transient processes, especially in Linux hosts, could be filtered out by inspecting
their lifespan of milliseconds. Figure 5.6 illustrates the CDF of process lifespan, which indicates
that around 90% of processes have a short life time less than 20 ms.
Our model also considers the context of a process, including the parent process, the number
of child processes, and the nature of the parent, as a set of important features. If a process is
created by a window manager (e.g., compiz is the default window manager in Ubuntu 16.04), the
process is more likely to be an interactive process. We also blacklist 16 types of commonly seen non-
interactive processes (e.g., “/etc/update” periodically runs on Ubuntu OSes) to remove unnecessary
distractions. It is hard to maintain a white-list since a process could be sometimes interactive and
sometimes non-interactive depending on user operations.
In total, we extract 11 features to build a random forest model based on Weka [53] to predict if
a process is interactive. In the training stage, we manually examine and label processes in 50 user
sessions (20 Linux sessions and 30Windows sessions) in a one-day period. An advantage with manual
effort is that we can deliberately search the mainexec of a process online and better understand
what the process is used for. The machine learning module is triggered when a process’s ending
event is observed or the process has too many activities, including batches, network connections,
and child processes.
More than 26,000 processes are labeled after filtering out the processes on the blacklist. We apply
10-fold cross-validation on all the processes, and the evaluation results are shown in Table 5.2. Our
machine learning module has a high accuracy and recall of 99.3%. However, the module has a fairly
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Figure 5.5: Batches in Processes Figure 5.6: Lifespan of Processes
low precision, which is only 71.1%. Therefore, in a user profile, there are a non-negligible portion
of processes that do not really interact with the user. However, even with those false positives,
the user profile has been largely reduced since the dominant factors of non-interactive processes are
mostly identified and pruned off. We argue that having some wrongly classified processes in the
profile is acceptable since the amount of noise created is limited and can be easily identified by the
security auditors.
5.6.4 Data Modeling
We model files accessed by both processes and sub-process branches, and compress them by only
recording the deviations from the model. This modeling process is done when the process is ended.
In most cases, the interaction detection module also kicks in at this moment. It produces the same
results no matter which module runs first, since the modeled processes will be pruned if they or
their ancestors are later decided to be non-interactive. On the other hand, pruned processes do not
go through the interaction detection stage. In fact, most processes do not live more than 20 ms (as
shown in Figure 5.6), and will be immediately pruned or modeled. In our implementation, we apply
data pruning, if applicable, before modeling for higher efficiency. As such, the evaluation results are
only applied on the interactive processes and their offspring. In contrast, non-interactive processes
are pruned off before any modeling can be done.
We build an FP-Tree [54] to model the commonly accessed files of the same mainexec on each
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host. The FP-Tree is frequently used to mine association rules from a growing data. We set the
Minimum Support Threshold (MST) to 0.3, so that files with frequency less than 0.3 are discarded
from the tree. To identify the common models, we record 100 instances or the number of instances
when UTrack has processed all events within the requested time period. The FP-Tree no longer
changes after the training period. At this stage, new processes with the same mainexec can be
modeled using the Tree.
Since many processes may have the same process branches that exhibit exactly the same system
behaviors, we compress the same branches into one and record the number of occurrences. Some
processes may have a random token in the mainexec, such as the Chrome renderer processes. We
handle them in a case-by-case manner. Similar to data pruning, our online branch modeling algo-
rithm adopts a bottom up approach, which starts modeling from the leaf processes and propagates
back to the parent process if no leaf process is alive. When a parent process notices that multiple
child processes have the same model, it merges these child processes and records the occurrence of
the model. The model of each process is represented in an XML-styled structure, which stores the
information of files, remote IPs, and mainexec of itself and its offspring. Note that the backward
propagation in our user session model stops at the interactive processes. This is because the model
becomes increasingly large in lower-depth process nodes due to the large number of child processes.
Also, it does not provide any help on compressing the data, because the process models at these
levels are rarely identical and thus hardly compressible.
In the 507 user sessions, 8,382 interactive processes and 176,822 other processes (i.e. the child
processes of the interactive processes) are identified. After modeling the branches, more than 71%
of the processes are compressed, leaving us 8,382 interactive processes and 50,394 of their child
processes. All 58,776 processes access more than 1.2 million files. After data modeling, the number
of files reduces to 502,446 (around 60% reduction), where a file model is counted as one file.
On average, each user session has about 116 processes, which is not a large number considering
that a user session can last for several days. However, the number of accessed files is large, almost
1,000 files per session profile. We observe that the majority of files come from process initialization,
since a new process can easily read hundreds of files during initialization. Although this initialization
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Figure 5.7: Example User Profile
Path1:C:/Users/X/appdata/local/microsoft/windows/temporaryInternetfiles/content.IE5
Path2: C:/Users/X/appdata/local/microsoft/outlook
Path3: C:/Users/X/appdata/local/TEMP
File1: C;/program files/common files/system/ado/msadox.dll
process can usually be modeled, our experiment period may not cover enough instances of the
processes, so all the files are preserved. When UTrack runs for a sufficiently long time, these
processes can also be modeled to reduce the number of files that a profile has.
5.6.5 Graph Presentation
A graph presentation of a user session profile visualizes the activities of a user, and it can provide
security auditors with system insight to make informed decision. However, it is challenging to
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present the session profile on a single graph, since the graph could be very large due to processes
accessing a large number of files or network connections in a long session. To alleviate this issue,
we abstract similar files and network connections when visualizing the session profile graph. The
abstraction is applied to files and network events. For files, we build a trie (a.k.a prefix tree) to
abstract the prefix of a set of files. Due to loss of information, we should carefully gauge the
degree of abstraction in different scenarios. In our case, the gain is the number of files that can be
abstracted when folding all nodes under a single node in the trie, and the cost is the loss on the
file path levels and filename characters. For network events, remote IP addresses are abstracted
by using the top-level and secondary-level domain names, e.g., “*.google.com”. When the domain
names cannot be found through a reverse DNS lookup, we adopt a network mask approach similar
to [55]. Specifically, class B and class C subnets are abstracted in a similar manner to that of file
abstraction.
Figure 5.7 depicts a simplified user session profile identified from our network environment. Two
different colors indicate two hosts. Processes, files, and remote IPs are represented by ovals, squares,
and diamonds, respectively. The complete graph has a total of 323 nodes. For simplicity, we omit
most unimportant files from the graph. We illustrate the 5 abstracted files read by “outlook.exe”
in the graph to give a basic idea of how the files look like after the abstraction step. For other
processes, we put the number of abstracted files and the number of total files inside the process
node. The case of a process without a number indicates that the files are completely modeled.
Meaningful files are preserved as nodes on the graph. The number of abstracted branches is shown
in brackets on edges.
From the figure, we can easily find the user’s activities in the network. The user logs in the
system on a Windows host and the session lasts for six hours. The session spans two hosts through
interactive ssh connections using “putty.exe.” On the Windows host, the user browses the Internet
via Chrome and uses Outlook for emailing. The user then logs on a remote Linux host to edit and
run a python program “X.py” (the file name is anonymized), which further runs the “ls” program a
couple of times. In general, a graph-based session profile presentation can be easily understood by
a human auditor, and provides insightful visibility on the activities of a user.
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5.6.6 Use Cases
Many more UBA features can be directly applied to UTrack for anomaly detection. For example,
one can audit the roles (user accounts) that a user has been playing in the network from the user
profiles and identify higher-level inconsistencies. For instance, one cannot be both “Alice” and “Bob”
in the same session profile. Besides providing a foundation of UBA systems, there are many other
use cases that can be built on top of UTrack. For example, it can be used in forensics analysis to
study the behavior of attackers (such that the attacker becomes the POI) and reveal more seemingly
benign behaviors which are in fact part of the cyber kill chain. UTrack can also be used to determine
the value of files (by the amount of time an employee spent on a file) for backing up digital asset.
This is particularly useful in fighting ransomware.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents UTrack, a novel user tracking system that connects events under different
user accounts and from different hosts to form a more holistic user session profile. With the help
of UTrack, a system auditor can easily find out the activities of users inside enterprise networks.
UTrack works by identifying a session root and then following both the local process lineage and the
network control flow of the session root to associate other activities of a user. For scalability and
salient description, UTrack employs an interaction detection module to sift out the most relevant
events that result from users’ interactions, and models common file and activity patterns. We deploy
UTrack in a real enterprise environment that contains 111 hosts for a period of one month. Our
evaluation shows that UTrack is capable of producing accurate and concise user session profiles for
system auditors to use.
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Chapter 6
Related Work
6.1 Password Study
Many works on password have been done through decades of password-based authentication. In one
of the earliest works [86], Morris and Thompson found that passwords are quite simple and thus are
vulnerable to guessing attacks. Nowadays, passwords studies are done on a much larger scale, and
thus they reveal more insightful and accurate characteristics of passwords. For example, Mazurek et
al. [84] measured 25,000 passwords from a university and revealed correlation between demographics
or other factors, such as gender and field of study. Li et al. [76] conducted a large-scale measurement
study on Chinese passwords, in which more than 100 million real-life passwords are studied and
differences between passwords in Chinese and other languages are presented. Bonneau [19] studied
the language effect on user passwords from more than 70 million passwords. Bonneau et al. also
found that a user’s birthdate appears extensively in 4-digit PINs [23]. Malone et al. [81] studied
the distribution of passwords on several large leaked datasets and found that user passwords fit Zipf
distribution well.
There are also many works investigating more specific aspects of passwords. For instance, Yan
et al. [123] and Kuo et al. [73] investigated the mnemonic passwords. Veras et al. [115] showed
the importance of a date in passwords. Das et al. [36] studied how users mangle one password for
different sites. Schweitzer et al. [100] studied the keyboard pattern in passwords. Apart from the
password itself, human habits and psychology toward password security are also being extensively
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investigated [44,57].
6.2 Password Strength Measurement
Password Strength measurement still remains a challenge. It has been shown that Shannon entropy
can hardly accurately describe the security level of passwords [26, 67, 95, 120]. Thus, a number of
metrics to measure passwords is introduced. Massey [82] proposed guessing entropy, which shows
the expected number of guesses needed to make a correct guess. Several other most commonly used
metrics include marginal guesswork µ↵ [95], which measures the number of expected guess needed
to succeed with probability ↵, and the marginal success rate    [24], which is the probability to
succeed in   guesses.
6.3 Password Cracking
Password-cracking methods have been discussed for more than 30 years. Attackers usually try to
recover plain-text passwords from a hashed password database. While reverse hashing function
is infeasible, dictionary attacks are found effective [86]. Reducing time-memory trade-off in pass-
words [56] even made dictionary attacks much more efficient. Rainbow table [89] further reduces the
table number in [56] using multiple reduction functions. However, in recent years as the password
policy has become strict, simple dictionary passwords are less common. More powerful attacks are
then created. Narayanan and Shmatikov [87] used the Markov model to generate guesses based on
the fact that passwords are phonetically similar to users’ native languages. OMEN [29] improves [87]
to crack passwords by using a more optimal guessing order. Another advanced attack is by using
PCFG [121], on which Personal-PCFG is built. Veras et al. [114] tried to leverage semantic patterns
in passwords. Besides, while attacking a hashed password database remains the main attacking
scenario, there are other attacks on different scenarios, such as video eavesdropping [15].
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6.4 Password Manager
Facing the dilemma of not being able to replace passwords, many works focus on helping users man-
age and remember their passwords, which indirectly enhance password strength due to decreased
memorability requirement. In consequence, password manager earns its prosperity. Despite ubiqui-
tous “memorize and fetch" type of password managers such as browser built-in password managers
or LastPass, researchers also proposed password managers that can enhance password security in
addition to usability [52,85, 97,119].
Password manager significantly reduce the memory burden on users. However, it has its own
usability and security problems [77]. Severe security issues may also be introduced due to the fact
that users failed to capture the correct mental model [31]. Silver et al. [102] demonstrated that
careless auto-filling policy on non-https websites could make passwords be extracted directly from
the web form by an attacker.
6.5 Enhancing Password Security
Facing the fact that passwords are a vulnerable authentication scheme, alternatives such as graphics-
based [37,60] or biometrics-based [59] authentication methods have been proposed. However, text-
based passwords are expected to continue to dominate [21].
Instead of trying to replacing passwords, there are many works focusing on enhancing password
security, including password strength feedback [30,71,120], multiple factor authentication [25,94,99],
and security enhancement tools [85, 97, 105, 119]. However, an ideal solution to enhance password
security without sacrificing usability, if existed, is yet to be found.
6.6 Multi-factor Authentication
Multi-Factor Authentication enhances authentication security by requiring two or even more factors.
Although there are cases that many factors are considered, such as Bank of America account recov-
ery [2], two-factor authentication (2FA) is generally considered as achieving a satisfactory security
level. Despite password as one factor, the other factor ranges from additional knowledges [25, 94],
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biometrics [61], to hardware tokens [11]. However, enabling 2FA sacrifices usability since it takes
considerably more time and effort to complete user authentication. Thus, 2FA has a limited adoption
rate [93].
6.7 Password Recovery
As an important component of password authentication, account recovery is increasingly important,
especially when users own increasing number of online accounts. Garfinkel [46] proposed Email-
based Identification and Authentication (EBIA), which authenticates a user based on the ability
to access a certain email address. Although it cannot universally replace password authentication,
EBIA has been a primary way for account recovery. Similarly, receiving calls or SMS on cell phones
is another de facto recovery scheme. One more previously popular recovery scheme is through
security question [63]. However, it has been shown that secret questions are weak [20, 99] because
the entropy is low and hence can be easily cracked through guessing or social engineering. Based
on large datasets from Google, Bonneau et al. [20] also demonstrated that secret questions have a
low recall rate and an easily constructible distribution. They also found that users try to supply
fake answers to make the questions harder to answer, which however, yields the opposite outcome.
6.8 User Tracking and UBA
User or user activity tracking has been extensively studied in different contexts and various tech-
niques have been proposed. One typical scenario is web user tracking through different mea-
sures [9, 13, 83]. User behavior tracking for the purpose of security drives UBA, where user ac-
counts are no longer the single indicator of who an incident is performed by. Nowadays, many
security companies have announced UBA tool integration or plan to develop UBA in their sys-
tems [14,58, 62,104,113].
UBA consists of two steps. The first is to model normal user behaviors, and the second is to
detect abnormal users by examining how deviated they are from normal users. There can be many
metrics, algorithms, or machine learning models being used to identify an abnormal user [101,104].
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Contemporary UBA mostly models users based on basic patterns or statistics, for example, several
basic statistics, such as total upload bytes and total download bytes of a user [101].
However, to detect more sophisticated attacks, it is vital to ensure high accuracy and descrip-
tiveness of user activities.
6.9 Log Audit
Log audit has been used in many fields of security research, such as forensics analysis [69, 70, 79],
intrusion recovery [49, 68], and intrusion detection [39]. One of the most widely adopted log levels
is the OS level, where the basic units are process, files, sockets, etc. The reason is that the OS
level maintains high fidelity of states of the entire system, as well as incurring acceptable CPU and
storage overhead [69]. There are previous works focusing on the reduction of the storage overhead
while not losing much information [75,122]. Besides, there are also previous works that attempt to
increase data granularity based on OS level logs [74,78].
One important use of log audit is to understand an attack, especially more sophisticated attacks
(APT attacks) or unknown attacks. Security experts rely on the logs to determine how an attack
happens [69, 74, 79], as well as its impact on the system [70]. They capture the causal relationship
among processes, files, or sockets, and reconstruct the provenance of an attack and its ramification.
Another broad genre of attack provenance is to use tainting techniques [64,124]. However, they all
rely on an detected attack as its start point so that backtracking and forward tracking are possible
to apply from the point. By contrast, our scheme has a different goal. We aim to build the input
used as part of the detection system.
HERCULE [92] leverages community discovery algorithms to identify an attack based on the
fact that the attack activities belong to the same community in a graph. [17] logs events at the
proxy and mainly focuses on parsing traffic from common application protocols, such as SQL and
SOAP.
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6.10 User Interaction Detection
The detection of bot generated data (system-triggered) from human-generated data (user-triggered)
is a long-studied subject that has applications in many fields. Generally there are two types of
detection. One is the active detection, such as CAPTCHA [117], which is easy to implement,
(arguably) more accurate, but intrusive. The other type is the passive detection. The passive de-
tection relies on processing log events to detect abnormal behaviors. The related previous works
include detecting game cheaters through Human Observational Proof [48], bots in online social net-
works [28,32,35,116], detecting malicious web bots/crawlers, Google reCaptcha [103], and malicious
crawler detection [118]. There are some significant differences between these techniques and ours. A
major one is that they have specially tailored data input. For example, user agent, cookie lifetime in
Google’s reCaptcha [103], a user account favored access log system in [48,118], or side information
such as social graph [28, 35, 48, 116]. However, in our setting, there is only a generic-purposed log
system, and the events are harder to interpret.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we present four research projects on enhancing the security of user authenti-
cation, particularly, the password-based authentication. In the first project, we perform a study
on the use of personal information in passwords, aiming to understand how users create their pass-
words with their personal information. We develop a novel metric — Coverage — to quantify the
correlation between a password and the personal information of a user. Then, we build an efficient
password cracker that is capable of generating personalized guesses. Our evaluation shows that our
password cracker is much faster than the state-of-the-art crackers with the knowledge of personal
information. The password study in this project is fueled up by the availability of numerous large-
sized leaked datasets. Although the structure of passwords has been well understood, the study on
password semantics still falls short. It is well-known that people from different culture and/or with
different native languages behave differently when constructing a password. One future research
direction is to collect more data that cover more users from different regions, so that we can better
understand how those users differ in choosing passwords. On the other hand, using leaked datasets
for research study raises ethical and privacy concerns, no matter how carefully researchers process
the data. Therefore, a future research topic could target at how to release password datasets with
minimum privacy leakage under different data sharing constraints.
The second project designs and develops BluePass, a distributed password manager that empha-
sizes to achieve both security and usability. On the security side, it requires a dual possession (i.e., a
master password and a mobile device) to access all site passwords with a two-factor authentication.
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On the usability side, it requires no user involvement for the authentication via the mobile device,
since it is done automatically using the short-ranged Bluetooth communication. In the future, we
envision user authentication could become more heterogeneous to compensate the security limits
of text-based passwords, especially with the rise of mobile devices that are equipped with a variety
of biometric input sources, such as fingerprints, iris, and facial recognition. Biometric-based user
authentication has been replacing passwords in certain applications, such as unlocking the smart-
phone with fingerprints. Thus, mobile-assisted authentication may be a promising direction on
user authentication in the future. The powerful mobile devices also provide a template to support
continuous user authentication and behavior monitoring.
The third project examines hundreds of top websites to unveil the contemporary implementation
of password recovery protocols. One critical observation is that most websites rely on emails to reset
the user passwords, which could lead to a potential single point of failure — if an email account
is compromised, all other accounts are also likely to be compromised by recovering the account
passwords through the email account. We estimate the likelihood and potential damage of such
an account recovery attack, and find that password recovery attacks are real and can cause serious
damages. Furthermore, many major email providers fail to properly protect users’ email accounts.
Finally, we propose a security enhancement protocol to secure the password recovery process in a
compatible and deployable fashion.
The password serves as a token to pass a gatekeeper, but it cannot guarantee an authenticated
user will not perform malicious activities after entering the system. Therefore, it is critical to keep
monitoring the user behaviors in order to identify malicious users that manage to conduct certain
levels of system breaches. In the fourth project, we design a user tracking system called UTrack
that tracks user behaviors with associated identities in an enterprise network system. It is based
on OS-level logs to construct complete and concise user profiles inside a network. Beyond one-time
password authentication, behavior-based user authenticity monitoring is an important trend. Many
security companies start to use UBA to identify suspicious users. The ability to continuously track
user behaviors largely complement the one-time nature of password-based authentication. Based
on UTrack, a number of end-solutions could be developed. For instance, it can empower intrusion
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detection systems on accurately detecting and identifying intruders based on a complete user profile.
A user tracking system could also be useful on determining the value of digital assets, which can be
done by assessing the amount of time spent on a file by employees. This is particularly useful for
fighting ransomware. Furthermore, it can be used to ensure that an employee follows the security
policy while operating on sensitive data.
UBA has been introduced only for several years, and it has become a very hot topic in both
academia and industry. We believe that there would be more accurate user modeling and more
effective detection techniques on various layers. Meanwhile, many questions arise to be answered.
For instance, for log-based UBA, it is challenging to collect and fuse data from different sources,
since they may have very diverse syntax and semantics. It is also non-trivial to instrument existing
software without significant performance degradation. Furthermore, the “needle in a haystack”
problem that widely exists in many log systems also needs to be addressed.
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